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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an Order for Summary Judgment and Dismissal with 
Prejudice entered by the Fourth District Court for Utah County, The Honorable Samuel 
McVey, Judge, which dismissed a legal malpractice action filed by the Appellant Dr. 
Michael H. Jensen ("Dr. Jensen") against Appellee Alan K. Young ("Young"). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the district court correctly rule that Dr. Jensen's purported 
legal malpractice claims against Young are barred by the four year statute of limitations 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (renumbered to 78B-2-307(3)) because Dr. 
Jensen did not file his claims until at least eight years after the causes of action accrued 
and after the undisputed evidence demonstrates he knew of his claims? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's decision granting summary 
judgment for correctness. See, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007 UT 52, f 9, 167 
P.3d 1011. 
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Preservation of Issue: Young raised and briefed this issue in his summary 
judgment memoranda. [R. 388-180; R. 749-565.] 
ISSUE NO. 2: Even if it is assumed for argument that Dr. Jensen's claims are not 
barred by the statute of limitations, is Dr. Jensen's claim for economic loss arising out of 
the First Broadcast on September 5, 1995, without merit as a matter of law for the 
additional reason, not reached by the district court, that the undisputed evidence 
demonstrates Young was not retained by Dr. Jensen until sometime after February 6, 
1997, many months after Dr. Jensen's claim was barred by the statute of limitations? 
Standard of Review: Although the district court did not reach this issue which was 
raised by Young on summary judgment, this Court can decide this issue and affirm on any 
ground that the district court could have relied upon in granting summary judgment. 
Afridi v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins, Co., 2005 UT 53, f 5, 122 P.3d 596, 598. 
This Court applies the same standard that the district court would apply, i.e., whether 
there is any genuine issue of material fact with respect to the economic loss claim which 
precludes summary judgment. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Preservation of Issue: Young raised and briefed this issue in his summary 
judgment memoranda. [R. 388-180; R. 749-565.] 
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ISSUE NO. 3: Even if it is assumed for argument that Dr. Jensen's claims are not 
barred by the statute of limitations, are Dr. Jensen's claims for punitive damages arising 
out of the First and Second Broadcasts barred for the additional reason, not reached by the 
district court, that this Court's decision in Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325 
bars the claims because this Court ruled that there was no proof of actual malice on the 
part of KTVX and Sawyers with respect to the Third Broadcast and the statements upon 
which Dr. Jensen relies in the First and Second Broadcasts were the same as the 
statements in the Third Broadcast? 
Standard of Review: Although the district court did not reach this issue which was 
raised by Young on summary judgment, this Court can decide this issue and affirm on any 
ground that the district court could have relied upon in granting summary judgment. See, 
Afridi, supra. This Court applies the same standard that the district court would apply, 
i.e., whether there is any genuine issue of material fact with respect to the economic loss 
claim which precludes summary judgment. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Preservation of Issue: Young raised and briefed this issue in his summary 
judgment memoranda. [R. 388-180; R. 749-565.] 
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III. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (renumbered to 78B-2-307(3)) provides that "An 
action may be brought within four years: (3) for relief not otherwise provided by law." 
In addition, Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative of the issues 
presented and is included in the Brief of Appellant. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Dr. Jensen obtained a judgment against KTVX television station and its reporter, 
Mary Sawyers ("Sawyers"), for false light invasion of privacy arising out of three news 
reports aired on KTVX in which Sawyers made statements relating to Dr. Jensen's illegal 
drug prescriptions for patients (the "Sawyers Case"). This Court reversed in part, holding 
that any claims relating to the first and second broadcasts on September 5, 1995, and June 
17, 1996, respectively, were barred by the one-year defamation statute of limitations 
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (renumbered to 78B-2-302(4)) because the 
Sawyers Case was not commenced until June 27, 1997. The Court also reversed all of the 
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economic loss damages relating to the third broadcast on November 6, 1996, because all 
such damages had been caused by the first broadcast and were therefore barred by the 
statute of limitations. Finally, the Court reversed the punitive damage award relating to 
the third broadcast on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to prove actual malice. 
On February 7, 2007, approximately 10 years after the alleged malpractice 
occurred, Dr. Jensen then commenced this action against Young, who initially 
represented Dr. Jensen in the Sawyers Case. Dr. Jensen alleges that Young committed 
malpractice by failing to commence the action within one year after the first broadcast, 
i.e., by September 5, 1996, or within one year after the second broadcast, i.e., by June 17, 
1997. 
After conducting discovery, Young filed a motion for summary judgment on three 
grounds. First, all claims against Young are barred by the four year statute of limitations 
for legal malpractice because this action was not filed until February 7, 2007, almost ten 
years after the last act of alleged malpractice occurred and eight years after Dr. Jensen 
undeniably knew of the alleged malpractice. Second, the undisputed evidence 
demonstrates that Dr. Jensen did not retain Young to represent him in this action until 
sometime after February 6, 1997, when Dr. Jensen wrote a letter to Young acknowledging 
that Young had not yet agreed to represent him. Dr. Jensen's claim for economic loss 
5 
relating to the first broadcast, which, as this Court ruled, caused all of Dr. Jensen's alleged 
economic loss damages, was barred by September 5, 1996, many months before Dr. 
Jensen retained Young. Third, Dr. Jensen's punitive damage claims relating to the First 
and Second Broadcasts are barred by this Court's decision that there was no proof of 
actual malice by KTVX and Sawyers. 
On July 22, 2008, the district court granted summary judgment on the basis that the 
malpractice claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The district court did not 
reach the other two grounds of the summary judgment motion. Summary judgment was 
entered on July 23, 2008. [R. 947.] Dr. Jensen timely filed this appeal on August 21, 
2008. [R.95L] 
B. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Geoff Goff ("Goff'), an executive producer for KTVX, met Dr. Jensen at a 
Fourth of July party in 1995 given by a mutual friend, a Ms. Johnson. Ms. Johnson 
remarked that she had to exercise all the time because her job required her to eat out so 
frequently. In response, Dr. Jensen offered to prescribe her diet drugs - amphetamines -
which he explained to Ms. Johnson were an easy and effective way to lose weight. Ms. 
Johnson did not express any interest in his offer, but Dr. Jensen nevertheless persisted and 
wrote a prescription, giving it to Ms. Johnson without taking any medical history or 
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making any appointment with her for a physical examination. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 
UT 81, If 2, 130 P.3d 325, 328 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A). [R. 
385-384,f 1.] 
2. Both Goff and Ms. Johnson believed that Dr. Jensen may have acted 
unethically in providing the prescription to a patient he had not examined. Goff believed 
at that point that there may be a news story. [R. 384, ^ f 2.] 
3. The next day, Goff wrote down what had happened at the party and gave it 
to KTVX medical affairs reporter, Sawyers, so she could look into the story. [R. 384, f^ 
3.] 
4. Sawyers called Dr. Jensen and explained to him that she was a reporter at 
KTVX and that Goff had referred her to Dr. Jensen as someone who could help her lose 
weight and asked if he could prescribe diet pills for her. Dr. Jensen replied that he 
probably could but that he would need to see her in person to prescribe diet pills and that 
although many physicians were reluctant to prescribe prescription diet pills, he was not 
reluctant. Dr. Jensen further told her that "[traditionally what has been used is 
Dexedrine" but "Dexedrine is technically illegal to . . . use as a diet pill" although 
sometimes he finds other disorders that he "felt comfortable using Dexedrine with." [R. 
384-383,14.] 
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5. Sawyers made an appointment to see Dr. Jensen and posed as a patient. She 
recorded her visit with a hidden camera. During the examination, Sawyers explained to 
Dr. Jensen that she was there to obtain the safest, easiest way to lose weight. Dr. Jensen 
explained that Fastin and Pondimin were at the time the most commonly prescribed 
prescription medications for weight loss, but if they did not work "I would be willing to 
work with you . . . maybe using Dexedrine." Dr. Jensen repeated his earlier comment that 
prescribing Dexedrine for weight loss was illegal. Dr. Jensen also told Sawyers that if 
Fastin was wearing off and she needed something to pick her up she could bite a small 
amount of the capsule as a means of breaking the time release form of the drug although 
doing so was considered a misuse of the drug. [R. 383, f 5.] 
6. During Sawyers's appointment, Dr. Jensen did not obtain a complete 
medical history of her, nor did he conduct a physical examination or ask her if she was 
taking any medication. Sawyers was not overweight or obese, and she was not weighed 
by Dr. Jensen or his staff. [R. 383,16.] 
7. Based upon her visit, Sawyers and KTVX aired three news reports 
concerning Dr. Jensen on September 5, 1995 (the "First Broadcast'5); June 17, 1996 (the 
"Second Broadcast"); and November 6, 1996 (the "Third Broadcast"). [R. 382,17.] 
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8. On September 6, 1995, the very next day after the First Broadcast, 
Columbia FirstMed terminated Dr. Jensen's employment and Mountain View Hospital in 
Utah County revoked Dr. Jensen's privileges to practice medicine at the hospital. IHC 
Health Plans also removed Dr. Jensen from its insurance panel due to his 
"unprofessional" and "possibly illegal" conduct that it believed had been disclosed in the 
First Broadcast. [R. 382, | 8.] 
9. Dr. Jensen claims that shortly after the First Broadcast, he spoke with 
Young at the Art City Family Medical Center where Dr. Jensen worked and that Young 
offered his services. [R. 382,19.] 
10. Dr. Jensen claims that on September 11, 1995, he called Young's law 
office, although Dr. Jensen had no recollection of the call, who he spoke with or what was 
said. Dr. Jensen's phone records indicate the call was one minute or less. [R. 382, ^ 10.] 
11. The day after the First Broadcast, the Department of Professional Licensing 
("DOPL") began an investigation of Dr. Jensen, and an investigator showed up at his 
clinic. Dr. Jensen retained attorney Max Wheeler to represent him in connection with the 
DOPL investigation soon after the First Broadcast. [R. 382-381, % 11.] 
12. Dr. Jensen claims that within two or three weeks after September 5, 1995, 
he met with Young at his law office. According to Dr. Jensen, Young was shown a tape 
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of the First Broadcast and told Dr. Jensen that he thought Dr. Jensen had a big money 
lawsuit and that Young liked the lawsuit. Dr. Jensen claims that Young said he was 
willing to take the lawsuit but he wanted to see what the DOPL investigation of Dr. 
Jensen showed. According to Dr. Jensen, Young stated, "I need to know whether you are 
a good guy or a bad guy, and then we can proceed." Dr. Jensen also claims that Young 
"said the case would be worth a lot of money" and that he had done well in a "big case" 
involving Geneva steel. Dr. Jensen recalled nothing more about the meeting. Dr. Jensen 
did not sign a retainer agreement with Young at that time. The next contact that Dr. 
Jensen can recall having with Young was over a year thereafter. [R. 381, j^ 12.] 
13. Dr. Jensen's phone records do not disclose a single telephone call with 
Young after the alleged first meeting until April 1997. Moreover, Dr. Jensen's calendars 
do not contain a single reference to any meeting or telephone call with Young until April 
9,1997, when Dr. Jensen signed a retainer agreement. [R. 381-380, % 13.] 
14. Nevertheless, Dr. Jensen now claims that as of the date of the alleged first 
meeting he considered Young to be his lawyer because Young "had told me he wanted 
the case, that he was just waiting for me to get through the DOPL thing." [R. 380, ^ 14.] 
15. DOPL filed a petition against Dr. Jensen on June 12, 1996, nine months 
after the First Broadcast, alleging that his treatment of Sawyers violated the Utah 
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Administrative Code and that Dr. Jensen had engaged in unprofessional conduct. [R. 
38051|15.] 
16. Dr. Jensen entered into an agreement with DOPL on October 30,1996 
(more than a year after the First Broadcast), pursuant to which the DOPL investigation 
was resolved and Dr. Jensen agreed to a public reprimand and to various other conditions, 
including meeting with the board quarterly and taking courses on ethics and controlled 
and dangerous substances. [R. 380, f 16.] 
17. On October 4, 1995, approximately one month after the First Broadcast, Dr. 
Jensen testified he met with Provo attorney Jackson Howard to solicit him to take Dr. 
Jensen's case and evaluate his tort claims. [R. 380, <[ 17.] 
18. Sometime after June 12, 1996, and before July 8, 1996, Dr. Jensen wrote 
Jackson Howard a letter in which he set forth some of his contentions regarding the First 
Broadcast. In that letter, he stated: "I would say I need legal advise [sic]. It would appear 
the state and channel 4 have also made themselves more liable." [R. 379, f 18.] 
19. In another letter, Dr. Jensen wrote to his DOPL lawyer, Max Wheeler, some 
time between June and October 1996, requesting that Wheeler provide advice as to how 
comments made by DOPL concerning the First Broadcast could be used to Dr. Jensen's 
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advantage. Immediately after this request, Dr. Jensen wrote: "I'll ask Jackson this too." 
[R. 379,119.] 
20. Dr. Jensen met with Howard again on July 8, 1996, after the Second 
Broadcast. Dr. Jensen sent his DOPL lawyer a letter in which Dr. Jensen stated that Mr. 
Howard had agreed to take the case.1 This letter was sent before the statute of limitations 
expired on the First Broadcast because (a) the letter includes a draft answer to the petition 
that DOPL filed against Dr. Jensen on June 12, 1996, and (b) Dr. Jensen's answer was 
filed on July 11, 1996. [R. 379, f 20.] 
21. The week prior to September 27, 1996, Dr. Jensen met with Charles H. 
Thronson, a lawyer with Parsons Behle & Latimer, to discuss Dr. Jensen's case against 
KTVX and Sawyers. On September 27, 1996, attorney Thronson sent Dr. Jensen a letter 
in which he declined to take Dr. Jensen's case principally because of the problem with the 
statute of limitations. Specifically, Thronson wrote: 
As I mentioned to you, the firm has a personal injury 
committee, which needs to consider whether or not to 
undertake specific litigation. I reviewed all of the information 
that you provided to me, including the documents and the 
1
 Dr. Jensen testified that Howard was interested in filing a claim against the state 
representative for violation of Dr. Jensen's constitutional rights and not a tort claim 
against Channel 4 and Sawyers. Dr. Jensen decided he did not want to sue the State. [R. 
379, n. 1.] 
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videotape with the committee. Unfortunately, primarily 
related to the statute of limitations questions which you and I 
discussed, the committee made the decision that the firm is 
not able at this time to undertake the litigation. 
[R. 378,121.] 
22. After the alleged first meeting with Young two or three weeks after the First 
Broadcast, the next time Dr. Jensen can recall contacting Young was after the Third 
Broadcast, which occurred on November 6,1996, when Dr. Jensen sent Young a letter 
dated November 12, 1996, with a tape of the Third Broadcast.2 Young allegedly said that 
"we shouldn't sit on this any longer, the third newscast is inflammatory and that we need 
to file a complaint." [R. 378-377,1f 22.] 
23. On January 27, 1997, Young sent Dr. Jensen a letter in which he stated: 
Dear Dr. Jensen: 
You have advised me that you will obtain the records or a 
letter from the state investigation for me. If you could get me 
that information, I can make a determination with regard to 
taking your case. 
Dr. Jensen understood that Young "wanted to see that the State's conclusions about me 
were completed" and "that the state was no longer going after me." Dr. Jensen 
2
 Dr. Jensen speculated that he may have met with Young again after the June 17, 1996 
Second Broadcast, but he did not have any recollection of such a meeting. [R. 377, n. 2.] 
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understood that this predicate did not occur until sometime after his agreement was 
signed with the State of Utah on October 30,1996, and after Young's January 27, 1997 
letter. [R. 377, If 23.] 
24. Dr. Jensen does not recall any conversation with Young prior to January 27, 
1997, in which he and Young had agreed how Young would be paid for his services. [R. 
377,124.] 
25. The next meeting that Dr. Jensen can identify with Young allegedly 
occurred within two or three months after the Third Broadcast. [R. 376,125.] 
26. On February 6, 1997, more than a year and five months after the First 
Broadcast, and more than four months after attorney Thronson had turned down his case, 
Dr. Jensen wrote a letter to Young in which Dr. Jensen discussed events with respect to 
the DOPL complaint, informed Young of the dates of the three KTVX broadcasts and 
stated: 
Allen / realize you have not yet accepted this case. But I do 
appreciate your interest so far. I am committed to pursuing 
tort issues, as I think my ability to help people as a doctor has 
in many ways been ruined by faund [sic] and slander, 
interestingly, so our friends at Channel 4 can sell 
commercials. I am hopeful a careful approach will pay off 
with the State until my next scheduled meeting with the 
Board. At that point, it's my intention to take a more assertive 
approach. [Emphasis added.] 
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[R. 376,f 26.] 
27. On April 9, 1997, Dr. Jensen signed a fee agreement by which he retained 
Young to represent him in filing suit against KTVX and Sawyers. [R. 376, 1 27.] 
28. Young filed a complaint on Dr. Jensen's behalf against KTVX and Sawyers 
on June 27, 1997. The original complaint filed by Young asserted claims for defamation 
arising out of the three broadcasts. [R. 375,128.] 
29. Young formally withdrew as Dr. Jensen's attorney on January 28, 1999. On 
December 30, 1998, Dr. Jensen signed a written retainer agreement in which he agreed to 
retain Dale F. Gardiner ("Gardiner") and agreed to pay Gardiner a fee of $120.00 per 
hour plus a percentage of any recovery. [R. 375,129 and R. 897 and 891.] 
30. After Young withdrew and Gardiner took over as Jensen's lawyer, KTVX 
and Sawyers filed a motion for summary judgment on Dr. Jensen's defamation claims 
relating to the First and Second Broadcasts, alleging they were barred by the one-year 
statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (renumbered to 78B-2-
302(4)). [R. 375,130.] 
31. Dr. Jensen responded to the statute of limitations defenses by seeking 
permission to amend his complaint to add claims, including false light invasion of privacy 
claims. The trial court granted summary judgment on the defamation claims on April 22, 
15 
1999, and permitted Dr. Jensen to amend his complaint. [R. 714-713.] The trial court 
also dismissed Dr. Jensen's fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. [R. 713.] 
Jensen admits he knew of this ruling in April 1999, knew that he had lost his defamation 
claims and knew he had been "disadvantaged." [R. 375, f 31.] 
32. Early in 1999, Gardiner performed substantial services on behalf of Dr. 
Jensen in opposing the motion for summary judgment filed by Sawyers and KTVX to 
dismiss the defamation claims on the basis they were barred by the statute of limitations. 
Gardiner also performed substantial services in successfully moving to amend the 
complaint to assert invasion of privacy claims to mitigate the damages arising from the 
dismissal of the defamation claims. Gardiner testified that as of February 17, 1999, Dr. 
Jensen had paid him $14,228.23 for his work and that the biggest part of those fees was 
for Gardiner's work in responding to the motion to dismiss the defamation claims on the 
statute of limitations grounds. Part of the fee was also for work done to seek leave to 
amend to add invasion of privacy claims. Thereafter, Dr. Jensen was billed and paid at 
least $1,250 more relating to the defamation motion and the motion to amend. [R. 897-
895 and R. 888-861.] 
33. Within 30 days after the defamation claims were dismissed on April 22, 
1999, Gardiner met with Dr. Jensen. Dr. Jensen understood he had been damaged by the 
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loss of his defamation claims. At that time Dr. Jensen discussed with Gardiner suing 
Young for legal malpractice for not timely filing the defamation claims. Dr. Jensen stated 
that he believed he had a malpractice claim against Young because Young's failure to act 
resulted in the loss of the defamation claims. Gardiner testified he told Dr. Jensen that he 
had made the decision that he would not personally sue other lawyers and that Dr. Jensen 
would have to get another lawyer to sue Young. Dr. Jensen said that he would talk to 
Young and others about filing a malpractice case. Dr. Jensen had not made up his mind 
whether he was going to sue Young. Gardiner had similar conversations with Dr. Jensen 
about filing a malpractice claim against Young three of four other times. (Id.) 
34. Although the trial court granted Dr. Jensen's motion to amend to assert the 
invasion of privacy claims to mitigate damages resulting from loss of the defamation 
claims, Gardiner understood that on a de novo review of the statute, the Utah Supreme 
Court may well rule that those claims were barred by the one year statute of limitations 
applicable to defamation claims and he so informed Dr. Jensen. Even though the trial 
court allowed amendment, Dr. Jensen knew that the defamation claims had been lost and 
that was why he was considering suing Young for malpractice. At no time did Gardiner 
assure Dr. Jensen that the false light claims would fix whatever damage was done to him 
as a result of the dismissal of his defamation claims. (Id.) 
17 
35. The jury returned a verdict for Dr. Jensen against KTVX and Sawyers for 
false light invasion of privacy on the First and Second Broadcasts and awarded him 
$520,000.00 in economic loss damages, $85,000.00 in general damages, and $245,300.00 
in punitive damages. The jury also returned a verdict for Dr. Jensen on the Third 
Broadcast for false light invasion of privacy and defamation, awarding him $1 million for 
economic loss, $500,000.00 in general damages and $450,600.00 in punitive damages. 
[R. 375-374, % 32.] 
36. Final judgment in the Sawyers Case was entered October 25, 2001, after 
which time Dr. Jensen had thirty days to appeal the dismissal of the defamation claims. 
Dr. Jensen filed no appeal regarding the dismissal of the defamation claims. [R. 374, f 
33.] 
37. The Supreme Court ruled that Dr. Jensen's claims for false light invasion of 
privacy on the First and Second Broadcasts were barred by the one year defamation 
statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (renumbered to 78B-2-
302(4)). The Court further reversed the $1 million economic loss award relating to the 
Third Broadcast, ruling that there was no evidence to support that award because the 
evidence demonstrated that all of Dr. Jensen's economic loss was caused by the First 
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Broadcast. The Court also ruled that there was no evidence of actual malice with respect 
to the Third Broadcast and therefore reversed the punitive damage award. [R. 374,134.] 
38. Dr. Jensen filed his complaint in the present action on February 7, 2007. 
[R. 374?]f 35 and R. 8.] 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly held that Dr. Jensen's malpractice claims are barred by 
the four year statute of limitations which began to run upon the occurrence of the last 
event required to form the elements of the cause of action when Young allegedly failed to 
timely file the claim relating to the First Broadcast by September 4, 1996 and failed to file 
the claim relating to the Second Broadcast by June 16,1997, or at the latest when the 
defamation claims were dismissed and attorneys' fees incurred as a result of the alleged 
malpractice in 1999. Dr. Jensen did not file his present lawsuit until February 7, 2007, 
approximately ten years after the statute of limitations expired on his defamation claims 
and at least eight years after the statute of limitations commenced on his malpractice 
claims against Young. 
Dr. Jensen attempts to avoid the statute of limitations by arguing that the discovery 
rule should be applied to toll the statute until this Court issued its decision in the Sawyers 
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Case on November 15, 2005. Dr. Jensen mistakenly argues that special circumstances 
exist because until that time he did not know, and could not have known, that he had been 
damaged by the alleged malpractice as the trial court in the Sawyers Case had permitted 
him to amend his complaint to allege false light invasion of privacy at the same time that 
his defamation claims were dismissed and the jury had awarded him a multi-million 
dollar verdict on the false light claims. This argument is without merit and was correctly 
rejected by the district court. 
Contrary to what Dr. Jensen argues, the undisputed evidence below demonstrated 
that he knew of the alleged malpractice in 1997 and knew the defamation claims had been 
dismissed on April 22, 1999, or shortly thereafter, and that he had been "disadvantaged" 
by the dismissal. Dr. Jensen's attorney conceded below that Dr. Jensen knew he had been 
damaged by that time and only argued the statute of limitations should not commence 
until Dr. Jensen knew the full extent of his damages. 
In fact, it was undisputed that after Young withdrew as his counsel Dr. Jensen 
repeatedly had discussions with his new attorney, Gardiner, about suing Young and was 
told that Gardiner would not sue another attorney and that Dr. Jensen would have to 
obtain other counsel to do so. It was also undisputed that Gardiner advised Dr. Jensen 
that the Supreme Court, in reviewing the statute of limitations issue de novo, may well 
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reverse the trial court's decision and hold that Dr. Jensen's false light claims were barred 
by the one year defamation statute of limitations. Gardiner never assured Dr. Jensen that 
the filing of the false light claims would remedy the damages caused by the dismissal of 
his defamation claims. Finally, it was undisputed below that as a result of Young's 
alleged malpractice, Dr. Jensen incurred damages of at least $15,000 in early 1999 in 
defending against dismissal of his defamation claims and obtaining permission to amend 
his complaint to assert the false light claims. 
Thus, the fact of Dr. Jensen's damages was certain back in 1997, but at least by 
1999. The only uncertainty was the amount of damages. Therefore, as a matter of law, 
the discovery rule is inapplicable because at least by 1999 Dr. Jensen knew of his 
malpractice claims against Young and that he had been damaged by Young's alleged 
malpractice. At the latest time he discovered his alleged claims, Dr. Jensen still had over 
16 months to file his alleged malpractice claim relating to the First Broadcast and over 
two years to file his alleged malpractice claim relating to the Second Broadcast. 
Because the special circumstances exception cannot otherwise be applied, it is not 
necessary to balance the hardships. However, if a balancing analysis were performed, the 
hardships clearly favor Young. Dr. Jensen's eight year delay in filing suit substantially 
prejudiced Young's ability to defend this case because of a lack of records and fading 
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memories. The only prejudice that Dr. Jensen has pointed to is that his claims would be 
barred if the statute of limitations is applied, which is the normal result of applying the 
statute of limitations. 
Even if it were assumed for argument that Dr. Jensen's claims are not barred by 
the statute of limitations, Dr. Jensen's economic loss and punitive damage claims are 
without merit and should be dismissed for two additional reasons not reached by the 
district court. This Court can affirm on any basis that the district court could have 
granted summary judgment. 
First, this Court ruled in the Sawyers Case that all of Dr. Jensen's economic loss 
was suffered as a result of the First Broadcast. The undisputed evidence demonstrated 
below that Dr. Jensen did not retain Young to represent him until months after the statute 
of limitations on the claim relating to the First Broadcast had expired. Indeed, Dr. 
Jensen's contact with Young prior to the expiration of the statute of limitation was limited 
to a telephone call of one minute or less and one alleged meeting in September 1995 
during which Dr. Jensen admits that Young told him that he wanted to await the results of 
the DOPL investigation before deciding whether to take the case. After that meeting, Dr. 
Jensen met with two other attorneys to attempt to get them to take his case and 
acknowledged in February 1997 that Young had not yet agreed to take the case. 
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Second, Dr. Jensen's claims for punitive damages are barred by this Court's 
decision in the Sawyers Case that no actual malice relating to the Third Broadcast was 
proven because Dr. Jensen relies upon the same statements made in the First and Second 
Broadcasts that were repeated in the Third Broadcast and which this Court has held were 
insufficient to demonstrate actual malice. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. DR. JENSEN'S MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The district court correctly held that Dr. Jensen's malpractice claims against 
Young are barred by the statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) 
(renumbered to 78B-2-307(3)) "for relief not otherwise provided for by law". The statute 
of limitations on a legal malpractice claim "begins to run upon the occurrence of the last 
event required to form the elements of the cause of action." Williams v. Howard, 970 
P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1998). The statute of limitations for Dr. Jensen's defamation 
claims was one year as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (renumbered to 78B-
2-302(4)). Dr. Jensen lost his defamation claims when Young allegedly failed to timely 
file the claim relating to the First Broadcast by September 4, 1996, and failed to file the 
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claim relating to the Second Broadcast by June 16, 1997.3 Dr. Jensen's claims against 
Young accrued at that time and the statute of limitations commenced running. The very 
latest date the claims could have accrued and the statute of limitations commenced was 
April 22, 1999, when the defamation claims were dismissed in the Sawyers Case and Dr. 
Jensen had incurred substantial attorneys' fees as a result of the alleged malpractice.4 
Williams, 970 P.2d at 1284. Dr. Jensen did not file the present suit until February 7, 
2007, approximately ten years after his defamation claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations and eight years after the defamation claims were dismissed. Consequently, 
Dr. Jensen's malpractice claims are barred by the four year statute of limitations. 
1. The Special Circumstances Prong of the Discovery Rule Cannot Be 
Applied Because Dr. Jensen Knew of the Alleged Malpractice and that 
He Had Been Damaged Back in 1997 and 1999, 
In his brief, Dr. Jensen argues incorrectly that the discovery rule should be applied to 
toll the statute of limitations until this Court issued its decision in the underlying Sawyers 
Case on November 15, 2005, because special circumstances supposedly exist that render 
the application of the normal statute of limitations rule that the statute begins to run when 
the legal malpractice is committed unjust and irrational. The only "special circumstance" 
3
 For purposes of this argument only, Young is assuming that Young was retained within 
a year after the First Broadcast, though, as demonstrated below, that did not occur. 
4Dr. Jensen did not appeal the dismissal of the defamation claims. 
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pointed to by Dr. Jensen is that he supposedly could not have known and did not know 
that he had a cause of action against Young for malpractice until this Court reversed his 
jury verdict and that prior to that time any damages were too remote and speculative 
where his "claims against KTVX were seemingly successfully amended to an alternative 
tort theory." [Aplt's Br. at pp. 17-27.] Dr. Jensen ignores the record by arguing that as an 
untrained layman he could not possibly have understood he was damaged before this 
Court ruled in the Sawyers Case in 2005. This argument finds no support in the law and 
is simply not faithful to the record below. 
The special circumstances rule is reserved "for 'more egregious circumstances.' 
[C]ourts should be cautious in tolling a statute of limitations, liberal tolling could 
potentially cause greater hardships than it would ultimately relieve." Grynberg v. Questar 
Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, f 65-66, 70 P.3d. 1,17. The rule can only be applied where the 
plaintiff did not and could not have discovered the claim prior to the expiration of the 
statute of limitations and it would be 'truly 'irrational' or 'unjust' to apply a statute of 
limitations." Id. 
In Williams, supra, the trial court had denied the Defendant attorney's motion for 
summary judgment on the basis of the four year statute of limitations, holding that the 
discovery rule applied and that the suit was filed within four years of discovery of the 
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malpractice. This Court reversed, holding that the statute of limitations commenced when 
the attorney failed to timely file the client's claim. The Court applied the traditional rule 
as to the applicability of the discovery rule: 
There are three situations in which we have determined that 
application of the discovery rule is appropriate: (1) where the 
application of the rule is mandated by statute; (2) where a 
plaintiff is unaware of a cause of action because of the 
defendant's misleading conduct or concealment; and (3) 
where application is warranted by the existence of special 
circumstances that would, based on a balancing test, render 
application of the statute of limitations unjust or irrational. 
»7//iflifw,970P.2datl285. 
The Williams Court held that the discovery rule was inapplicable in the face of claimed 
special circumstances because the client was informed of the malpractice and could have 
filed a malpractice suit before expiration of the normal statute of limitations. 
In Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, \ 19, 156 P.3d 
806, 812, this Court reiterated its holding in Williams, stating "for this [special 
circumstances] exception to apply, 'an initial showing must be made that the plaintiff did 
not know and could not have reasonably discovered the facts underlying the cause of 
action in time to commence an action within [the limitations period]/" [Footnote omitted.] 
See also Beaver County v. Prop. Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Comm % 2006 UT 6,132, 
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128 P.3d 1187, 1194; Estes v. Tibbs, 1999 UT 52, ffl 8-9, 979 P.2d 823, 824; Warren v. 
Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1144 (Utah 1992). 
The discovery rule cannot be applied in the present case because the undisputed 
evidence demonstrates Dr. Jensen knew of his malpractice claims and could have 
commenced suit long before the normal statute of limitations expired. According to Dr. 
Jensen's own story, shortly after the original complaint was filed against KTVX in 1997, 
Young informed him that Young had "blown" the statute with respect to the First and 
Second Broadcasts. [Aplt.'s Br. at p. 12.]5 Further, Dr. Jensen admittedly knew of the 
alleged malpractice at the latest when the district court dismissed the defamation claims 
relating to the First and Second Broadcasts on April 22, 1999. He testified that, in fact, he 
knew of the malpractice at that time and knew he had been "disadvantaged." [SOF No. 
31.] Indeed, during oral argument below, Dr. Jensen's attorney conceded that Dr. Jensen 
5
 Dr. Jensen argued below that Young concealed his malpractice by telling Dr. Jensen that 
although he had "blown" the statute of limitations on the defamation claim Young was 
going after fraud, which claim was not affected by the statute of limitations problem and 
that this statement constituted misleading conduct or concealment, which was a ground 
for applying the discovery rule. Dr. Jensen has understandably abandoned this meritless 
argument on appeal. For purposes of argument, taking Dr. Jensen's testimony on its face, 
he knew there had been malpractice, he knew that it was an issue, but understood that 
Young was attempting to mitigate by asserting claims of fraud. Most fundamentally, Dr. 
Jensen's fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims against Sawyers and KTVX were 
dismissed by the trial court on April 22, 1999, at the same time that the defamation claims 
were dismissed. [SOF No. 31.] Thus, Dr. Jensen could not have been relying on his 
fraud claims for recovery after that date. 
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knew back in 1999 and before that Young "had blown . . . two statutes of limitation" and 
that Dr. Jensen "could have sued Mr. Young." [R. 958 at p. 25.] Counsel stated the issue 
was whether the statute of limitations commenced before Dr. Jensen knew the "extent of 
the damages." [Id.] 
Moreover, Dr. Jensen's new attorney, Gardiner, who replaced Young, testified he 
had conversations with Dr. Jensen shortly after the defamation claims were dismissed in 
April 1999, in which Dr. Jensen acknowledged and understood he had been damaged by 
the loss of his defamation claims. Dr. Jensen discussed with Gardiner suing Young for 
legal malpractice for not timely filing the claims and told Gardiner he believed he had a 
malpractice claim against Young. Gardiner told Dr. Jensen he would not personally sue 
other lawyers. Dr. Jensen said he would talk to Young and others about filing a 
malpractice case but that Dr. Jensen had not made up his mind whether he was going to 
sue Young. Gardiner testified he had similar conversations with Dr. Jensen about filing a 
malpractice claim against Young approximately three or four other times. [SOF No. 33.] 
Gardiner testified that he understood that although the trial court had allowed Dr. 
Jensen to amend to assert invasion of privacy claims to mitigate damages resulting from 
the loss of the defamation claims, this Court may well rule on a de novo review of the 
statute that those claims were barred by the one year statute of limitations applicable to 
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defamation claims and that he so informed Dr. Jensen. [SOF No. 34.] At no time did 
Gardiner tell Dr. Jensen that the false light claims would fix whatever damage was done to 
him as a result of the dismissal of the defamation claims. [SOF No. 34.]6 Gardiner's 
testimony is not surprising (nor is it contradicted by Dr. Jensen). As this Court noted in 
the Sawyers Case: "The operative facts of his false light invasion of privacy claims 
alleged defamation. In fact, they are the same facts he pleaded under his defamation 
causes of action that were dismissed as untimely." Jensen 2005 UT 81 at f^ 49. Thus, this 
Court ruled that Dr. Jensen's claims must be "classified as defamation claims." Id. at f^ 34. 
Indeed, this Court's decision in Jensen v. Sawyers that the one-year defamation 
statute of limitations applied to Dr. Jensen's false light claims that he was defamed was 
foretold by the Court's earlier decision in Russell v. Thomson Newspapers Inc., 842 P.2d 
896 (Utah 1992), which was decided three years before the First Broadcast. In Russell the 
Court held that Utah's statutory "fair report" privilege applicable to allegations of 
defamation extended to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon 
the same operative facts that gave rise to the defamation claims. Id. at 902-903. The 
Russell Court supported its holding by citing with approval cases in other states applying 
6
 Notably, Dr. Jensen never testified below why he decided not to sue Young back in 
1999. Counsel's implicit argument that he did not do so because the Sawyers Case had 
not been decided is mere speculation unsupported by any evidence. 
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shorter statutes of limitations for defamation and libel to causes of action for false light 
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon defamatory 
statements. Id. at 906, n. 37. And, in Jensen v. Sawyers, the Supreme Court noted that the 
cases that it relied upon in Russell: 
. . . to buttress the merits of applying the fair report privilege to 
a cause of action closely allied to defamation are equally 
persuasive for the actual proposition they advanced: that the 
statute of limitations for defamation governs the claims based 
on the same operative facts that would support a defamation 
action. 
2005 UT 81 at 153. 
Moreover, Dr. Jensen knew he was damaged not only by loss of the defamation 
claims but by the money spent in opposing the motion to dismiss those claims and 
obtaining permission to allege the false light claims. Dr. Jensen incurred approximately 
$15,000 in fees in early 1999 in opposing the dismissal of the defamation claims and 
obtaining permission to amend his complaint to allege the false light claims. [SOF No. 
32.] This damage alone was sufficient to trigger the commencement of the statute of 
limitations. 
Thus, the discovery rule is inapplicable because back in 1999 when Dr. Jensen 
clearly knew at the latest that he had been damaged both by the loss of his defamation 
claims and the attorneys fees he incurred in fighting dismissal he still had well over sixteen 
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months to file his alleged malpractice claim relating to the First Broadcast and over two 
years to file his alleged malpractice claim relating to the Second Broadcast. 
These facts are not disputed and Dr. Jensen does not really argue that he did not 
know he had been damaged at least by 1999. Instead, he insists the statute should not 
commence until he knew the full extent of his damages. Dr. Jensen has been unable to cite 
a single case where a court has held that the statute of limitations does not commence 
running until a plaintiff knows the full extent of his injuries. Certainly, that is not the law 
in Utah. A cause of action accrues when injury is inflicted, not when the amount of 
damages is later determined or when all damages are incurred and known. See, e.g., 
Jepson v. State Dep't of Corrections, 846 P.2d 485, 488 (Utah App. 1993) ("[W]e 
conclude that Jepson's cause of action against the State accrued on the date of the 
accident. At that point, Jepson had sustained injury to support a cause of action, 
irrespective of whether 6the full extent of damages had been ascertained... ."'). 
For example, in Cedar Prof I Plaza LC v. Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT App. 36, f 
14, 131 P.3d 275, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment dismissing the 
complaint for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act, rejecting the plaintiffs argument that it did not know of its claim within the 
statute of limitations. The Court ruled that the plaintiff "was not entitled to wait until it 
31 
knew all of the facts supporting its negligence claim/' but it was enough that the plaintiff 
was aware that the defendant's "action or inaction had resulted in some kind of harm to its 
interest/' quoting from Bank One Utah NA v. West Jordan City, 2002 UT App. 271, f 12, 
54P.3dl35. 
In Williams v. Howard, supra, this Court held that the statute commenced running 
when the malpractice occurred even though the plaintiff still had a claim against the 
manufacturer of the defective water meter cover, by which claim the plaintiff could have 
mitigated some or all of his damages. See also Armstrong v. McMurray, 2005 UT App 88 
(applying Williams)', Schwinn v. Cook, 2004 UT App 372 (same). 
Similarly, in Watkiss & Saperstein v. Williams, 931 P.2d 840, 843-844 (Utah 1996), 
a case upon which Dr. Jensen placed significant weight below, a malpractice claim was 
barred by the statute of limitations under District of Columbia law because the statute 
began running when the client incurred $7,235 in additional legal fees as a result of the 
attorney's alleged malpractice in applying for an FTC television station license to attempt 
to avoid the harm caused by the malpractice, not when the FTC later denied the television 
station license, (citing Knight v. Furlow, 553 A.2d 1232 (D.C. 1989)). 
And, in Brown v. Behles & Davis, 86 P.3d 605, 608 (N.M. App. 2004), the court 
held that the malpractice cause of action accrued at the date of the alleged malpractice 
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when the plaintiffs lost the right to avoid liens on their property through a bankruptcy 
proceeding and not years later when the Tenth Circuit reversed the avoidance of the liens, 
explaining: 
A party sustains actual injury when the alleged malpractice 
'results in the loss of a right, remedy or interest, or in the 
imposition of a liability... regardless of whether future 
events may affect the permanency of the injury or the amount 
of monetary damages eventually incurred.9 
Accord, Burtoffv. Faris, 935 A.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C.C.A. 2007) ("\ . . a claim for legal 
malpractice accrues when the plaintiff has sustained some injury, even if the injury occurs 
prior to the time at which the precise amount of damage can be ascertained.'"); Huff v. 
Roach, 106 P.3d 268, 270 (Wash. App. 2005) (clients were damaged when the attorney 
missed the statute of limitations in the underlying case, "effectively invading their legal 
interests" and therefore the malpractice statute of limitations commenced running at that 
time and not later when the statute of limitations was raised as a defense in the underlying 
action). Fritzeen v. Gravel, 830 A.2d 49, 53-54 (Vt. 2003); Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 18 CulA* 739, 744 (1998); Basinger v. Sullivan, 540 
N.E.2d 91, 93 (Ind. App. 1989) ( . . . to commence the running of the statute of limitations, 
it is not necessary that the extent of the damage be known or ascertainable but only that 
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damage has occurred."); Cantu v. St. Paul Companies, 514 N.E.2d 666, 668 (Mass. 
1987). 
Finally, in Vansickle v. Kohout, 599 S.E.2d 856, 857-860 (W.Va. 2004), an 
attorney missed a deadline for appealing a worker's compensation decision. The client 
hired a new attorney to attempt to mitigate damages by pursuing appeals. The court held 
that the statute of limitations commenced running at the time of the malpractice and was 
not tolled during the time appeals were being pursued to mitigate the damages. See also 
Janicki Logging & Const Co., Inc. v. Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C., 37 P.3d 309, 
313 (Wash. App. 2001). 
Dr. Jensen cites Wagner v. Sellinger, 847 A.2d 1151, 1156 (D.C. 2004) for the 
proposition that "[w]here the injury caused by legal malpractice is only materialized by an 
adverse judgment against the injured party in the underlying matter, any injury is too 
speculative or remote for the party to ascertain prior to that final judgment." Wagner is 
easily distinguished. That case did not involve a statute of limitations and plaintiffs 
suffered no injury at all until they lost their medical malpractice lawsuit because of the 
defendant attorney's malpractice in that lawsuit. The court recognized, however, that "the 
plaintiff need not be fully informed about the injury for the statute to begin running; she 
need only have some knowledge of some injury." Id. at 1154. [Emphasis added.] 
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I he other cases cited by Dr. Jensen in his brief in this regard [see Aplt's Br. at 20-
23] all involve the same situation where no damage whatsoever had been sustained before 
the resolution of the underlying case in which the malpractice was committed For 
i Ipp 1998), 'the court held that the malpractice action against 'the law firm was premature 
because no actual damages had been suffered, but instead damages were a mere 
potentiality. I he court acknowledged, how evei
 9 that damages ai e oiil) speculati v e 
damages...." Id. at 478. [Emphasis added.] 
The court also recognized that where an attorney's negligence is a direct cause of ' 
legal expenses muim, ill In llic plauilill lliusi1 alloinns Ices an; damages w hirh are 
sufficient to commence the running of the statute of limitations, citing the court's prior 
decision .-:. Got >.•• Giieherman, 659 N.E.2d 56 (111. App 1995). In Goran, the 
c uiart attorne}' withdraw .som representing i.ne clients in an appea;. out as a re.^,u ; i 
1lic attorney's pie\ IOU^ iieyjo I lllln « IK nil iiinnrrd 1»l ,tHl m jfinitrys1 lu;s lu hiiii11 In i 
brief into compliance with court rules. The court held that the $1,297 in attorneys'' fees 
triggered commencement of the statute of limitations. Id. at 477-478. Of course, that is 
precisely" the situation i n the case at bar. 
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Dr. Jensen argues that it would be illogical and unfair to rule that the statute of 
limitations began runniag before he knew the full extent of his damages and that if he had 
to file within four years of 1999 he could not have recovered the damages that he knew 
about only when this Court applied the statute of limitations in 2005. To the contrary, it 
is not at all unusual that a plaintiff does not know the full extent of injuries or damages 
(present or future) until years after the wrongful act is committed. Nevertheless, the 
statute of limitations begins running when some injury is suffered. That does not mean 
that a plaintiff is left unprotected with respect to injuries, the full extent of which will not 
be known until some future time. In the present case, for example, Dr. Jensen could have 
protected himself by entering into a tolling agreement with Young by which the parties 
agreed to toll the statute of limitations until this Court decided the Sawyers Case. 
Alternatively, Dr. Jensen could have filed his malpractice case against Young and then 
obtained an order from the court staying the action pending a final decision in the 
Sawyers Case.7 Under either alternative, Young's interests would have been protected 
because he would have been given notice that Dr. Jensen was asserting, or intended to 
7
 In Vansickle, supra, the court noted that its holding applying the statute of limitations 
did not preclude lawyers from entering into tolling agreements where the amount of 
damages may yet be uncertain or indicate that malpractice actions may not be stayed by a 
court "in order to await the conclusion of some other proceeding that might establish a 
client's damages." 599 S.E.2d at 861. 
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assert, a malpractice case against him and Young could have taken appropriate action to 
preserve records and witness memories. 
On the other hand, it would be extreme^ unuu • *> peim,; a pianim; >Uvii a* .Dr. 
Jensen In vuiil imlrfinilHv In filr i iii;ili)i;n:lii c Klium niinlil in IIIKII.TIVIN" I'iht i IIIMII' 
i-or example, in the case at bar, the Sawyers Case was not decided "until almost a 
J
~"de after the last act of malpractice was allegedly committed. In the interim, Young 
K i; :uc, .i•.. . .. -. ., _ .*.• _... or malpractice and, had :to reason to take steps to 
protect himself by r-v <^ -:*:* -•? -n~H --, ; mem* tries. 
Although Dr. Jensen argues that a ""balancing of hardships" analysis favors his 
position, such an analysis is inapposite in this case. Dr. Jensen cannot meet this Court's 
threshold showing for (In .ippliCiilion oi special ciiuiiimiancc . .- >CL lorthabo .\ 
because it is undisputed he cannot make "an initial shown-' ~-* *K -v • • ' \ 
Jensen] did not know, and could not have reasonably discovered the facts underlying the 
cause of action, in time to commence an action wiuiii« u-, • u.^, i::unatkni> penou]." 
balance would be in favor of Young. 
Dr. Jensen's failure to file his malpractice claims for a decade after the malpractice 
vv as allegedly committed has substantial^ prejudiced Y ou> ^ > u jility to defend against 
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the claims because of the passage of time, impaired memories of witnesses and lack of 
records. All Dr. Jensen can point to as prejudice is that if the statute of limitations is 
applied he will lose his claims. That is the normal result of the application of the statute 
of limitations and is not a special circumstance. Dr. Jensen cites Klinger v. Knightly, 791 
P.2d 868 (Utah 1990) to attempt to support his position on prejudice. However, in that 
case the plaintiffs had no reason to suspect malpractice had been committed and could not 
have reasonably done anything to discover the surveying error sooner. In any event, Dr. 
Jensen has only himself to blame for not filing his alleged malpractice claims years ago 
when the defamation claims (and fraud claim) were dismissed and he knew he had been 
financially damaged and he repeatedly discussed with his attorney filing suit against 
Young. 
For all of these reasons, the district court correctly decided that Dr. Jensen's 
purported malpractice claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
B. DR. JENSEN'S ECONOMIC LOSS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIMS 
ARE WITHOUT MERIT FOR TWO ADDITIONAL REASONS NOT 
REACHED BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
If the Court affirms on the statute of limitations issue, it need not reach the 
alternative grounds for affirmance discussed in this section. However, even if it is 
erroneously assumed for purposes of argument that Dr. Jensen's claims are not barred by 
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the statute of limitations, this Court should, affirm the summary judgment because, as a 
matter of law, Dr. Jensen's economic loss and punitive damage claims are w ithout merit 
for t^ o additional reasons asseilotll Ihv \ ntuiii" mi sijitiiiui \ indjjiiicnl, hul mol icached bv 
(In; (li'iilnn roiml ilns Court can affinn on any basis upon which the district court could 
have based its decision.8 See, Afridi, supra, 
1
 All of Dr. Jensen's Alleged Economic Loss Was Suffered as a Result of 
the First Broadcast and Any Claim for Such Loss Was Barred Long 
Before Dr. Jensen Retained Young to Represent Him. 
This Court ruled in the Sawyers Case that all of Dr. Jensen's alleged economic loss 
w as suffered as the result of the First Broadcast on September 5,, 1.995. [SOF No, ^4."j 
Dr. Jensens claims tor SUCH images were therefore barred under the one-year 
d--... -« .' * 'tinieij HI 1 lifih < "<Hlrj Aim i) 7K«P-1(»f4i (renumbered 
to 78B-2-302(4j) bv September 5, 1996. Yet, Dr. Jensen did not sign a fee agreement 
- .ining Young to represent him until many months later on April 9, 1997 
. In this connection, Dr. Jensen semi "*i (mug a lellei delicti I'ebruan "ft, I" W , 
informing Voting, of ("he dnte- -• >!K- three broadcasts and statine. "Allen I realize you 
have not yet accepted this va-. ^ :- No, 26 ] Thus. Dr. Jensen knew as of February 6,, 
8
 If the Court were to reverse on the statute of limitations issue, it should nevertheless 
decide these alternative grounds for dismissing the economic loss and punitive damage 
claims because dismissal of these claims would greatly simplify the case, leaving only a 
small general damages claim to be deci.ico 
"0 
1997, that Young had not agreed to represent him. Of course, in order to recover for legal 
malpractice, Dr. Jensen is required to prove the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship with Young at the relevant time. 
In Utah, an implied attorney-client relationship may exist if a client reasonably 
believes that he or she is represented by the attorney. Kilpatrick v. Wiley Rein & Fielding, 
2001 UT 107, If 47, 37 P.3d 1130. "However, a party's belief that an attorney-client 
relationship exists, unless reasonably induced by representations or conduct of the 
attorney, is not sufficient to create a confidential attorney-client relationship." Breuer-
Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990). Accord, Guilledeau v. 
Jenkins, 355 S.E.2d 453, 458 (Ga. App. 1987); Fox v. Pollack, 226 Cal. Rptr. 532, 535 
(1986). 
Here, Dr. Jenson could not have reasonably believed that Young represented him 
prior to February 6, 1997, because Dr. Jensen unequivocally acknowledged in his letter 
that Young had not accepted the case.9 
9
 Below, Dr. Jensen tried to down play the significance of the letter by arguing in 
conclusory fashion that "the statement made in the letter was in reference to Young's 
desire to wait to file claims against KTVX until the resolution of the DOPL 
investigation." [R. 50.] That argument substantially distorts the letter and Dr. Jensen's 
deposition testimony about the letter. Indeed, when questioned at his deposition 
regarding his statement "Allen I realize you have not yet accepted this case," Dr. Jensen 
did not distort or "put a spin" on its plain meaning, as he does now. To the contrary, Dr. 
Jensen testified as follows: 
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Moreover, the week before September 27, 1996, Dr. Jensen met with attorney 
Charles Thronson to discuss Thronson taking h is case. Thronson declined to do so by 
letter dated September 2 1 , 1996, pri.iii.aril) ' because of the problem,,, with the statute -
limitations that I h ronsonhad discussed v ith, lensen at the if meeting. [SOF N: ] 
Equally importantly, on October 4, 1995, approximately one month after the First 
Broadcast (and after Dr. Jensen claims Young agreed to take the case), Dr. Jensen 
<iw.j.;ju:TO\t. ,. .. :. • .... « - i Sti) s that he 
U" •••• * ^ ~ ir.v. ' i v v;r ' J % after st^idine hun a letter stating "I would say i 
need legal advise [sic]." Dr. Jensen informed his attorney in the DOPL investigation that 
Mr. Howard had agreed to take Dr. Jensen's case. This was prior to the expiration of 
the statute of 11 in ita11n11s <' 11111v I ;i i sI Broadcast [S< ] 
(), / mi i "you confirming or are you not confirming he" s [ t oung] not) ret 
jit i I'pted the ca se? 
A. / choose to read it as stated: "Allen* 1 realize you have not yet 
accepted this case. But I do appreciate your interest so far." I 
consider that to be a correct statement 
O All right So it's just what the plain meaning oj the statement is, 
fair? 
A. It is. 
[R. 722-721 (Emphasis added).] 
Clearly, based upon Dr. Jensen's attempt to get Thronson and Howard to take his 
case and Dr. Jensen's letter of February 6, 1997, acknowledging that Young had not 
agreed to take the case, Dr. Jensen could not have reasonably believed at these times that 
Young represented him. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Jensen testified in his deposition only in conclusory terms that he 
considered Young to be his lawyer after the alleged first meeting shortly after the First 
Broadcast. Dr. Jensen strategically asserted this position even though he had not signed a 
retainer agreement, even though he had no agreement with Young on how Young would 
be paid, and even though at the alleged first meeting, Young allegedly told Jensen that he 
wanted to take the case but he wanted to see what the DOPL investigation showed first so 
that Young would know whether Dr. Jensen was a "good guy or a bad guy." 
Moreover, Dr. Jensen's alleged belief, even if taken at face value for the purpose 
of summary judgment, was not reasonable as a matter of law and therefore did not give 
rise to an attorney-client relationship between Dr. Jensen and Young. As demonstrated 
above, a client's belief that an attorney-client relationship exists is insufficient unless 
"reasonably induced by representations or conduct of the attorney...." Breuer-Harrison, 
799 P.2d at 727. Based upon the only words that Dr. Jensen puts into Young's mouth at 
the first meeting, Young did not agree to take the case, but wanted to see the results of the 
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DOPL investigation first. The DOPL investigation was not completed and the stipulation 
with DOPL entered into until October 30, 1996, almost two months after the statute of 
limitations exp^rcu on u.v d^aiuuuoii c;jim relating to the First Broadcast 
communication with Young until fourteen months later on November 12, 1996, when Dr. 
Jensen sent Young a tape of the Third Broadcast. [SOT Nos 1 ^ 22.] Young had still not 
received a copy of the stij . . ^ u ^ . *., : ^ . . .., v * . g wrote 
his Janu: 2" 997 lette • " ^ouestinc ' * '^ ' ]?+tr ".could 
review Dr. Jensen's agreement with DO:*L »•_'*« ^ecutc -« hctncr to take 'he < ase. 
Importantly,. Dr, Jensen understood that Young "wanted to see that the state's conclusions 
ahouill ilie ivci't cnmpk'lnl ""IIMI I lie stale u*is iiiiiii Inngei goiny alki nu " iiiul 
c o n c e r n w a s n o t satisfled until sometime after Youne's* :anuan 27. 1997 letter r^< )F 
No. 23.] Further, as referenced above, Jensen confirmed in a letter dated Februan .^ 
1997 dial ike unav.i .Vu« *a Young had not yet agreed to take the case. [SOF N o. 26.] 
I )i leihi/m also mistakenly nrpued hciov llvil i nvn il nn iltorrir1 if limit 
xwx^ wv/^ sh^ p existed prior to April, 1997, Young had duties to him as a prospective client 
to advise him on the statute of limitations because "Dr. Jensen received advice from 
Young b> senuiiiu :*;n; ieuer.>. waii;:.t mm, and giving him copies oi \ ideotapes to 
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review." [R. 500-499.] However, under Utah law, Young had no duty to advise Dr. 
Jensen unless and until Dr. Jensen had a reasonable belief that Young was representing 
him and that reasonable belief must have been induced by Young's conduct. This is no 
doubt why Dr. Jensen cited cases from other states inconsistent with Utah Law to attempt 
to support his argument. This argument also finds no support in the record. 
In this connection, in the cases cited by Dr. Jensen below there was significantly 
more communication between the lawyer and the prospective client than in the case at 
bar. For example, in Togstad v. Vesely Otto Miller andKeefe, 299 N.W.2d 686, 693 
(Minn. 1980), the court found that an attorney-client relationship actually existed, that the 
client went to the attorney who told her that there was not a case and why, did not inform 
the client that the attorney lacked expertise in the medical malpractice area and did not 
inform the client of the statute of limitations. 
There is not a shred of evidence, other than Dr. Jensen's self-proclaimed belief, 
that an attorney-client relationship existed with Young prior to April, 1997. Because Dr. 
Jensen could not have reasonably believed that Young represented him prior to April 
1997, Young had no duty to advise him on the statute of limitations prior to that time. 
Dr. Jensen's claim for economic loss damages therefore fails. 
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Consequently, because Dr. Jensen's claim for $520,000 in economic loss relating 
u>the4 First Broadcast was already barred long before Dr. Jensen retainer mm. , "oung was 
.* summaryju^i-c:. 
reason. " ' . v . 
2. As a Matter of Law, Dr. Jensen Is Not Entitled to Recover Punitive 
Damages Relating to the First and Second Broadcasts. 
lh lilt' ^u>\\c,1:* va.se. Liu; jury a w a r d s . ..-. . \ : : ^ . ;?-.. . -..;;:. . . „ ^ T 
$24-W>- - - ,
 arded Dr. Jensen 
$450,600.00 in punitive damages relating to the Third Broadcast, Although this Court 
stated that its impression was "that the third broadcast was likely the least defensible of ' 
the three, we conclude Lhal il? tniiltnil dms nnl i c\ cal «n lual mil ice and Ihnvlnrv i unilr 
the P • " • /• *•• '.-W:K:^ / Jensen, 2005 UT 81, | 11 /. The Court explained that: 
"[S]tatei:.j:i!- J : actual malice are those made 'with knowledge that [they] were false or 
[made] with reckless disregard of "whether [they] wea. jui:*e or not,'" quoting from Bose 
Coti onsunurs I nam, l<Wi I I N -1" "i I'lN-'MP il |M -Il /*/ ill 1 I I 
The Court held that the contents of the Third Broadcast "fall short of indicating 
personal 'malice rising to the level of hatred or ill-will on (he p;4rt of defendants against 
Dr. Jensen.' Jensen, -00:* i 11 JS 1 , ^ | i " il I lie L our: .u ;.\. : «. .jrc was 
insufficient evidence from whirh (he ( nnrl roulrl nitielmlc (lu'i! defendants "did not hold 
[5 
an honest belief that Dr. Jensen had offered or promised her [Sawyers] Dexedrine, which 
is illegal for use in weight loss." Id. at ]f 122. The Court went on to observe that "[i]t is 
clear that Dr. Jensen manifested an intent or willingness to act in a specific manner - to 
provide Dexedrine - although it was not legal for weight loss purposes." Id. 
This Court's decision in the Sawyers Case likewise bars any claim for punitive 
damages relating to the First and Second Broadcast. The district court did not reach this 
issue because it held the claims relating to the First and Second Broadcasts were barred 
by the statute of limitations. The part of the Third Broadcast showing Dr. Jensen telling 
Sawyers that "[i]f Fastin didn't work for you, I'd be willing to work with you, ah, maybe, 
using Dexedrine. It's technically not legal for that reason" was a replay from the First 
Broadcast. Thus, this Court has already ruled that this report contained in the First 
Broadcast which was repeated in the Third Broadcast does not support an award of 
punitive damages. 
The Second Broadcast only reported that DOPL had filed a petition for 
unprofessional conduct against Jensen and again reviewed the report aired in the First 
Broadcast that Dr. Jensen had offered to "work with" Sawyers on illegally prescribing her 
Dexedrine. Id. at Tf 15. It was undisputably true that DOPL filed a petition for 
unprofessional conduct against Dr. Jensen. Id. at f^ 14. And, once again, the repetition of 
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the same report aired in the First Broadcast that this Court has already held does not 
support punitive damages cannot support punitive damages with respect to the Second 
Broadcast. 
I'm these reasons, [>r Jensen s .'limns le ixw-wi \\\v pin ili\e damages Ilk' \nv\ 
awarded with respect to the First and Second Broadcasts were properly dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
I m -nil i.il tin1 f(ji'egi»iug reasons, lite Summary Judgment should be affirmed In 
the alternative, if for some reason the Court should reverse on the statute of limitations 
Issue, the Court: should nevertheless affirm the dismissal of the economic loss and 
™.:. :... uainage claims on the alternative grounds. 
- • "r'V-:- :•• (i::v . S,
 :)tenibci 2DW. 
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Westlaw 
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130 F.3d 325,33 Media L. Rep. 25 1 8, 539 Utah \d\ Rep. 6, 2005 I J I ' 81 
(Cite as: 130 P.3d 325) 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Michael JENSEN, M.D., Plaintiff; Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant 
Mary SAWY ERh an J ^ n ucu icic vjsion, Inc., aka 
KTVX, Defendants. Appellants, and Cross-Ap-
No\. ;>. 20li 
Rertearinc TVr't"i s *> :C 06 
Background: Doctor brought action against report-
er and television station for defamation, invasion of 
privacy, and intentional interference with economic 
relations following news broadcasts of doctor's al-
leged hidden camera admissions regarding prescrip-
tion diet pills. The District Court, Fourth District, 
Prove Department, Ray M. Harding, Jr ,, J., entered 
judgment on jury verdict for doctor, but reduced 
damages award and denied attorney's fees and 
costs. Reporter and. television station appealed, and 
doctor cross-appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Nehring, J., held 
that 
(1) false light: invasion of privacy el aims were prop-
erly classified as defamation claims and thus were 
subject to one-year statute of limitations; 
(2) doctor was not: required to show that news 
broadcast portrayed private information about him 
in order to recover on claim of false light invasion 
of privacy; 
(3) Court' would not review, based on a traditional 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, jux) 
verdict in favor of doctor on intrusion upon seclu-
sion species of invasion of privacy claim; 
(4) failure to marshall evidence regarding the sub-
stantial truth of statements on news broadcast con-
cerning doctor's willingness to prescribe diet pills 
jon^ace
 fc.am: *.», ^i^cal. 
(5- broadcast did not result in ecomnnk loss such 
thai vioctoi could recover damages for defamation: 
/porter did not act with "actual malice" when 
.ated in news broadcast that doctor "promised" 
:• i!legal drug:>. at 
(7) invasion of privacy claims based on newsgath-
ering did not substantially overlap with defamation 
and false light claims based on news broadcast such 
that doctor was entitled to attorney's fees for unsuc-
cessfti 1 newsgallien.ng c 1 ai:m.s 
Affi.riii.ed. in. part and reversed in part, 
West Headnotes 
| 1 | Appeal and Lr «r *0 C=>1?9(1) 
r>pea- and i:rn< 
*0\ 
Question 
Presentai. -i tv. * , 
-ounds oi Review 
\ '. Issues and Que> 
>0kHQ Suftlcier. 
ir muT 
i 
Cases 
Trial court ruling \ ,-JJ aoetor,- false light invasion 
of privacy claims against reporter and television 
station were not time-barred, made in the context of 
denying defendants -notion for summary judgment 
seeking dismissal of the claims on statute of limita-
tnons grounds, adequately preserved for review the 
issue of the question of the applicable statute of 
limitations, although defendants did not reassert 
their statute of limitations claim at trial. 
. • »k>el A nd Sianuei 237 © ^ 7 6 
23 7 Libel and Slant:JI 
2371V Actions 
237TV(A) Right of Action and Defenses 
237k76 k. Time to Sue and. Limitations. 
Most Cited Cases 
©2009 1 In >mson Reuters. N( > Cli tin: n t i • Oi ig I JS Gi i ' ; i >rk s, 
130 P.3d 325, 33 Media L. Rep. 2578, 539 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 2005 UT 81 
(Cite as: 130 P3d 325) 
Page 2 
One-year limitations period applies to actions for 
defamation. West's U.C.A. § 78-12-29(4). 
[3] Libel and Slander 237 €=>1 
237 Libel and Slander 
2371 Words and Acts Actionable, and Liability 
Therefor 
237kl k. Nature and Elements of Defamation 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Slander and libel are a subset of defamation. 
[4] Libel and Slander 237 C=>24 
237 Libel and Slander 
2371 Words and Acts Actionable, and Liability 
Therefor 
237k23 Publication 
237k24 k. Slander. Most Cited Cases 
"Slander" consists of the publication of defamatory 
matter by spoken words, transitory gestures or by 
any form of communication other than libel. Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 568(2). 
[5] Libel and Slander 237 C=>25 
237 Libel and Slander 
2371 Words and Acts Actionable, and Liability 
Therefor 
237k23 Publication 
237k25 k. Libel. Most Cited Cases 
"Liber1 consists of the publication of defamatory 
matter by written or printed words in physical form 
or by any other form of communication that has the 
potentially harmful qualities characteristic of writ-
ten or printed words. Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 568(1). 
[6] Libel and Slander 237 €=>68 
237 Libel and Slander 
237IV Actions 
237IV(A) Right of Action and Defenses 
237k68 k. Nature and Form of Remedy. 
Most Cited Cases 
Libel and Slander 237 €=>76 
237 Libel and Slander 
237IV Actions 
237IV(A) Right of Action and Defenses 
237k76 k. Time to Sue and Limitations. 
Most Cited Cases 
Doctor's false light invasion of privacy claims 
against reporter and television station arising out of 
news broadcasts concerning prescription diet pills 
were properly classified as defamation claims and 
thus were subject to one-year statute of limitations, 
such that complaints regarding first two of three 
news broadcasts were time-barred; doctor had 
stated in his complaint that false statements during 
news broadcasts had harmed his reputation. West's 
U.C.A. §78-12-29. 
[7] Libel and Slander 237 €==>! 
237 Libel and Slander 
2371 Words and Acts Actionable, and Liability 
Therefor 
237kl k. Nature and Elements of Defamation 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
"Defamation" is the act of harming the reputation 
of another by making a false statement to a third 
person. 
[8] Torts 379 €=>353 
379 Torts 
379IV Privacy and Publicity 
379IV(B) Privacy 
379IV(B)3 Publications or Communica-
tions in General 
379k352 False Light 
379k353 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
An actionable portrayal of a person in a false light 
may or may not include the communication of de-
famatory information about the victim. 
[9] Torts 379 €=>354 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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3^9 Torts-
~ ~ o f \ p r i vacy an cil Pub II, it c ity 
3"Mv(B) Pri\ ac) 
379IV(B)3 Publications or Communica-
tions in General 
379k352 False Light 
379k354 k. Particular Cases in Gen-
eral. Most Cited Cases 
Doctor was not required to show that news broad-
cast portrayed private information about him in or-
der to recover on, claim, of 'false light invasion, of 
privacy against reporter and television station 
which broadcast news feature that stated that doctor 
had promised reported illegal drugs and had re-
ceived public reprimand. 
[10] \ppea l and Error 30 €=>181 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation, in. Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(B) Objections and Motions, and, "R uiings 
Thereon 
30kl81 k. Necessity of Objections in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
The plain error test has three parts; the demonstra-
tion of error, a qualitative showing that the error 
was plain,, manifest, or obvious to the trial court, 
and, evidence that the error affected the substantial 
rights of a party., 
[ I l l Appeal and. Error 30 C=?218.2(2) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in. Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(B) Objections and !v lotioils, and R uIIings 
Thereon 
30k218 Verdict and. Findings by Jury 
30k218.2 Special Interrogatories and. 
Finding-
30k218.2(2) k. Nature of Error or 
Defect. Most Cited Cases 
ealaai Error 30 €=>757(3) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30X11 Briefs 
30k757 Statement of Case or of Facts 
30k,757(3) k. Statement of Evident *• >.. t 
Cited Cases 
Supreme Court would, not review, based on a tradi-
tional challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 
jury verdict in favor of doctor on intrusion upon se-
clusion species of invasion of privacy claim, against 
reporter and television station, given that reporter 
and station failed to object to jury verdict on intru-
sior upon seclusion and also failed to marshal! the 
evidence. West's U.C..A. § 76-9-402. 
[12] Appeal and Error 30 G=>766 
30 Appeal and Error 
30X11 Briefs 
30k766 k. Defects, Objectioris, arid !!» „mend 
ments. Most Cited Cases 
Reporter and television station foiled to preserve or 
brief argument in footnote that it was impossible 
for television station to be liable for invasion of pri-
vac> if reporter was not liable, and thus Supreme 
Courr would not address claim. West's U.C.A. § 
" 7 ( > . 0 - 4 ' P ( t » i -». 
.gliuence 
272XVIII Actions 
272XVIII(D) Questions for Jury and Direc-
ted ^ e«vi. 
. 2k 1693 k. Negligence as Question of 
Met or Lav\ Generally. Most Cited Cases 
The question of whether a defendant's conduct fell 
neiow a particular standard of care is one to !x de 
4 ^ -Mo-menf 231H €==»87 
2 >! 1 i Labor and Employ men; 
:
" '" Rights and Dutn.-- oi Lnoloyers and 
©2009Th( iiist HI 1 Leutei 1.1 h i Cli tiei, ti > Orig. I JS G< > \, W < irks. 
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Employees in General 
231Hk87 k. Privacy in General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Torts 379 €=>331 
379 Torts 
379IV Privacy and Publicity 
379IV(B) Privacy 
379IV(B)1 Privacy in General 
379k331 k. Nature and Extent of Right 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Subject to certain limitations, the workplace enjoys 
lesser privacy protections than a dwelling. 
[15] Torts 379 €=»340 
379 Torts 
379IV Privacy and Publicity 
379IV(B) Privacy 
379IV(B)2 Intrusion 
379k340 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Torts 379 €=»376 
379 Torts 
379IV Privacy and Publicity 
379IV(B) Privacy 
379IV(B)5 Questions of Law or Fact 
379k376 k. Intrusion. Most Cited 
Cases 
Whether a person is entitled to solitude of seclusion 
is a relative and highly fact-dependent matter. 
[16] Appeal and Error 30 €=>893(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(F) Trial De Novo 
30k892 Trial De Novo 
30k893 Cases Triable in Appellate 
Court 
30k893(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Supreme Court would not conduct de novo review 
of jury verdict in favor of doctor on intrusion upon 
seclusion claim against reporter and television sta-
tion. 
[17] Appeal and Error 30 €=>766 
30 Appeal and Error 
30X11 Briefs 
30k766 k. Defects, Objections, and Amend-
ments. Most Cited Cases 
Reporter's and television station's failure to mar-
shall evidence regarding the substantial truth of 
their allegedly defamatory statements on news 
broadcast concerning doctor's willingness to pre-
scribe diet pills forfeited claim on appeal to Su-
preme Court's substantial evidence review of the 
defense of substantial truth. 
[18] Appeal and Error 30 €=>840{3) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k840 Review of Specific Questions 
and Particular Decisions 
30kS40(3) k. Review of Constitu-
tional Questions. Most Cited Cases 
Where the First Amendment is implicated, the actu-
al malice finding acquires the status of a constitu-
tional fact requiring an appellate court to conduct 
an independent examination of the whole record to 
test its worthiness. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1. 
[19] Appeal and Error 30 €=»842(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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30k842(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 €=>1010.1(16) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court 
30kl010 Sufficiency of Evidence in 
Support 
30kl010.1 In General 
30kl010.1(8) Particular Cases 
and Questions 
30kl010.1(16)k. Negligence 
and Torts in General. Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court would review issue of whether me-
dia defendants' allegedly defamatory statements 
were substantially true as a traditional question of 
fact and would will set aside the jury verdict, which 
was based in part on the finding that defendants' 
statements were not substantially true, only if there 
existed no substantial evidence to support it. 
[20] Appeal and Error 30 €=>766 
30 Appeal and Error 
30X11 Briefs 
30k766 k. Defects, Objections, and Amend-
ments. Most Cited Cases 
Reporter and television station failed to brief novel 
contentions on appeal that Supreme Court consider-
ing defamation action should evaluate the issue of 
substantial truth for correctness because they raised 
the issues in motions for summary judgment and for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict 0nov), and 
thus Supreme Court would decline to consider 
them. 
[21] Appeal and Error 30 €=>1001(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVI(I)2 Verdicts 
30kl001 Sufficiency of Evidence in 
Support 
30kl001(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
The Supreme Court will disturb a jury verdict chal-
lenged for lack of evidence only if it concludes that 
the quantity and quality of the evidence fall short of 
substantial. 
[22] Appeal and Error 30 €=>930(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(G) Presumptions 
30k930 Verdict 
30k930(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 €=>989 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVI(I)1 In General 
30k988 Extent of Review 
30k989 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Where evidence may be susceptible to multiple in-
terpretations, some tending to support the verdict, 
others pointing to an ill-advised result, the Supreme 
Court will indulge only those reasonable inferences 
favorable to the verdict. 
[231 Libel and Slander 237 €=»32 
237 Libel and Slander 
2371 Words and Acts Actionable, and Liability 
Therefor 
237k31 Injury from Defamation 
237k32 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Third news broadcast regarding doctor's alleged 
promise to prescribe illegal diet pills and his pun-
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ishment by state did not result in economic loss 
such that doctor could recover damages for defama-
tion; doctor's loss of insurance panel privileges oc-
curred prior to third broadcast, doctor voluntarily 
left clinic for nursing home work after his hours 
were decreased following the broadcast, and doc-
tor's income increased after he left the clinic. 
[24] Libel and Slander 237 €»51(1) 
237 Libel and Slander 
23711 Privileged Communications, and Malice 
Therein 
237k51 Existence and Effect of Malice 
237k51(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Statements of "actual malice" are those made with 
knowledge that they were false or made with reck-
less disregard of whether they were false or not. 
[25] Libel and Slander 237 €=>120(2) 
237 Libel and Slander 
237IV Actions 
237IV(D) Damages 
237kl20 Exemplary 
23 7k 120(2) k. On Ground of Malice or 
Recklessness. Most Cited Cases 
Television reporter did not act with "actual malice" 
necessary for punitive damages when she stated in 
allegedly defamatory news broadcast that doctor 
"promised" her illegal drugs, although newscast 
was not fair and balanced; doctor had manifested an 
intent or willingness to prescribe a drug to help re-
porter lose weight even though the drug was not 
legal for weight loss purposes, reporter had con-
firmed that prescribing that drug for weight loss 
was illegal, and reporter believed that doctor had 
offered her illegal drugs on camera. 
[26] Costs 102 €=»194.16 
102 Costs 
102VIII Attorney Fees 
102k 194.16 k. American Rule; Necessity of 
Contractual or Statutory Authorization or Grounds 
in Equity. Most Cited Cases 
Attorney fees are awarded only when authorized by 
statute or by contract. 
[27] Appeal and Error 30 €=>1024.1 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVI(I)6 Questions of Fact on Motions 
or Other Interlocutory or Special Proceedings 
30kl024.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
The award of attorney fees is a matter of law re-
viewed for correctness. 
[28] Appeal and Error 30 €=>984(5) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k984 Costs and Allowances 
30k984(5) k. Attorney Fees. Most 
Cited Cases 
Costs 102 €=>19<M8 
102 Costs 
102VIII Attorney Fees 
102kl94.18 k. Items and Amount; Hours; 
Rate. Most Cited Cases 
A trial court has broad discretion in determining 
what constitutes a reasonable fee, and the Supreme 
Court will consider that determination against an 
abuse-of-discretion standard. 
[29] Appeal and Error 30 C=>984(5) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k984 Costs and Allowances 
30k984(5) k. Attorney Fees. Most 
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Cited Cases 
The standard of review on appeal of the amount of 
a trial court's award of attorney fees is patent error 
or clear abuse of discretion. 
[30] Costs 102 €=>194.25 
102 Costs 
102VIII Attorney Fees 
102k 194.24 Particular Actions or Proceed-
ings 
102kl94.25 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Doctor's invasion of privacy claims based on news-
gathering did not substantially overlap with defam-
ation and false light claims based on news broad-
cast such that doctor was entitled to attorney's fees 
for unsuccessful newsgathering claims; there was 
not a core of facts common to all claims, and the 
legal theories were unrelated. 
[31] Costs 102 C=>194.18 
102 Costs 
102VIII Attorney Fees 
102k 194.18 k. Items and Amount; Hours; 
Rate. Most Cited Cases 
In general, a prevailing party may collect attorney 
fees on noncompensable claims only if those claims 
substantially overlap with compensable claims. 
[32] Appeal and Error 30 C=>761 
30 Appeal and Error 
30X11 Briefs 
30k761 k. Points and Arguments. Most Cited 
Cases 
Attorney's statement on appeal that, if the court ex-
amined his submissions, it would see that the criter-
ia for attorney's fees was met, was insufficient ar-
gument on appeal for Supreme Court to override 
trial court's finding that attorney failed to ad-
equately divide time and fees expended for success-
ful claims and unsuccessful claims. 
[33] Costs 102 €=»198 
102 Costs 
102IX Taxation 
102k 198 k. Form and Requisites of Applica-
tion in General. Most Cited Cases 
The party requesting the attorney fees must categor-
ize the time and fees expended for: (1) successful 
claims for which there may be an entitlement to at-
torney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there 
may be an entitlement to attorney fees had the 
claims been successful, and (3) claims for which 
there is no entitlement to attorney fees. 
[34] Costs 102 €=>206 
102 Costs 
102IX Taxation 
102k206 k. Objections to Taxation or to 
Items. Most Cited Cases 
Reporter sufficiently complied with Rules of Civil 
Procedure when she filed objection, rather than a 
motion, opposing doctor's claimed costs in defama-
tion action. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(d)(2). 
[35] Costs 102 e=»154 
102 Costs 
102VII Amount, Rate, and Items 
102k 154 k. Depositions and Affidavits. Most 
Cited Cases 
Costs 102 €=>169 
102 Costs 
102VII Amount, Rate, and Items 
102k 169 k. Disbursements in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Costs 102 €=»187 
102 Costs 
102VII Amount, Rate, and Items 
102k 183 Witnesses'Fees 
102k 187 k. Experts. Most Cited Cases 
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Costs 102 €=>189 
102 Costs 
102 VII Amount, Rate, and Items 
102k 189 k. Stenographers' Fees. Most Cited 
Cases 
Doctor's transcript costs, expert witness fees, court 
equipment expenses, and other out-of-pocket costs 
were not necessary and taxable as costs; deposition 
costs were not essential, and doctor could not 
demonstrate that a less expensive means of obtain-
ing the transcripts would not have been practical. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(d)(2). 
[361 Appeal and Error 30 €=>984(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k984 Costs and Allowances 
30k984(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
A trial court's decision to award the prevailing 
party its costs will be reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(d)(2). 
*328 Dale F. Gardiner, Douglas J. Parry, Craig R. 
Kleinman, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Robert M. Anderson, Jennifer Anderson Whitlock, 
Bradley M. Strassberg, Salt Lake City, and Thomas 
B. Kelley, Steven D. Zansberg, Denver, CO, for de-
fendants. 
NEHRING, Justice: 
f 1 Defendants Mary Sawyers and United Televi-
sion appeal a jury verdict that they defamed Dr. Mi-
chael Jensen, invaded his privacy, and intentionally 
interfered with his economic relations. Dr. Jensen 
cross-appeals the trial court's reduction of part of 
the damages award. He also cross-appeals the deni-
al of attorney fees and denial of necessary disburse-
ments as costs. We reverse in part and affirm in 
part. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
U 2 Geoff Goff, an executive producer for Channel 
4, KTVX, in Salt Lake City, Utah, met Dr. Michael 
Jensen at a 1995 Fourth of July party given by a 
mutual friend, Ms. Johnson. Ms. Johnson, a restaur-
ant critic, remarked to her cousin, Mr. Goff, and Dr. 
Jensen that she had to exercise all the time because 
her job required her to eat out so frequently. In re-
sponse to her jocular comment, Dr. Jensen offered 
to prescribe her diet drugs-amphetamines-which he 
explained to Ms. Johnson were an easy and effect-
ive way to lose weight. Ms. Johnson did not express 
any interest in his offer. Dr. Jensen nevertheless 
persisted and wrote a prescription, giving it to Ms. 
Johnson. He did so without taking a medical history 
or making any appointment with her for a physical 
examination. Ms. Johnson told Dr. Jensen she was 
not interested in the prescription, but Dr. Jensen ad-
vised her to hold on to it, in case she wanted to fill 
it later. Mr. Goff testified that he found it "unusual" 
that a doctor would be handing out a prescription 
for amphetamines at a party with no knowledge of 
Ms. Johnson's medical history or background. 
% 3 Later that evening, after Dr. Jensen had left the 
party, Mr. Goff and Ms. Johnson discussed the 
"unusual" interaction with the *329 physician. Both 
believed that Dr. Jensen may have acted unethically 
in providing a prescription for amphetamines to a 
patient he had not examined. Mr. Goff stated that 
"[a]t that point I began to feel that we ... had maybe 
a news story here." The following day, Mr. Goff 
met with KTVX news director John Edwards and 
recounted Dr. Jensen's statements made at the 
party. Mr. Goff "wrote up the facts as [he] knew 
them ... to give to Mary Sawyers [the station's med-
ical issues reporter] so she could begin looking into 
the story." 
1 4 Ms. Sawyers called Dr. Jensen and explained 
that her managing news editor at KTVX, Mr. Goff, 
had referred her to Dr. Jensen as someone who 
could help her lose weight. During the conversa-
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tion, Ms. Sawyers explained that she was a reporter, 
but implied that she was calling Dr. Jensen as a 
prospective patient and not as a reporter. Ms. Saw-
yers told Dr. Jensen that she had "been on this diet 
lately and [had not] been able to lose much 
weight," so she asked if he could prescribe diet pills 
for her. He replied that "yeah, [he] probably could." 
Dr. Jensen told her that he would need to see her in 
person to prescribe diet pills. He also relayed that 
"I'm the guy to talk about weight loss ... many 
physicians are reluctant to prescribe prescription 
diet pills. I really am not." Dr. Jensen told her that 
he prescribed Fastin and Pondimin, but that 
"[traditionally what has been used is Dexedrine. 
Dexedrine is technically illegal to ... use as a diet 
pill. Though I... sometimes find people have other 
disorders that I... feel comfortable using Dexedrine 
with." 
f 5 Ms. Sawyers found Dr. Jensen's admission that 
he found ways to prescribe Dexedrine as a diet drug 
"out of the ordinary" and, based on her further re-
search about state laws relating to prescribing 
drugs, likely illegal. As a result, Ms. Sawyers de-
cided to further pursue the story, concluding that it 
was "an issue of vital public interest." 
f 6 Ms. Sawyers, Mr. Goff, and Mr. Edwards de-
cided that Ms. Sawyers would pose as a patient and 
visit Dr. Jensen. She would record her visit with a 
hidden camera. The three believed that this plan 
provided the best way to obtain candid information 
from Dr. Jensen about his weight loss treatment 
practices. 
t 7 Ms. Sawyers scheduled a face-to-face appoint-
ment with Dr. Jensen. Ms. Sawyers met with Dr. 
Jensen in an examination room at the Columbia 
FirstMed Clinic in Orem, Utah. Ms. Sawyers ex-
plained that she was there to obtain the "safest, 
easiest way to lose weight." Dr. Jensen explained 
that Fastin and Pondimin were, at that time, the 
most commonly prescribed medications for weight 
loss. He added that "[i]f Fastin didn't work for you, 
I would be willing to work with you ... maybe using 
Dexedrine," but repeated his earlier comment that 
prescribing Dexedrine for weight loss was illegal. 
Dr. Jensen advised Ms. Sawyers that if she felt her 
Fastin was wearing off and needed something to 
pick her up, she could "take a small amount of the 
capsule and bite it" as a means of "breaking the 
time release form" of the drug, although doing so is 
considered a misuse of that drug. 
K 8 During the appointment, Dr. Jensen did not ob-
tain a complete medical history of Ms. Sawyers. He 
did not conduct a physical examination. He did not 
ask her if she was then taking any medication. Dr. 
Jensen's nurse took Ms. Sawyers' vital signs and 
asked if she was allergic to any medicines. Ms. 
Sawyers was not overweight or obese, and she was 
not weighed by Dr. Jensen or his staff. 
f 9 Approximately one month later, Ms. Sawyers 
met with David Robinson, the director of Utah's Di-
vision of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
("DOPL"). Ms. Sawyers showed Mr. Robinson the 
video tape of her appointment with Dr. Jensen. 
After viewing the tape, Mr. Robinson expressed his 
concerns about Dr. Jensen's interactions with Ms. 
Sawyers, stating that "I think when you look at the 
intent of the physician, it's clear that he knows that 
he is violating the law and is offering excuses for it. 
And I think he is doing so with potential jeopardy 
to his patients.... I'm very concerned about it." 
f 10 After meeting with Mr. Robinson, Ms. Saw-
yers arranged a second meeting with Dr. Jensen. 
She told him that she wanted to interview him and 
that she intended to present*330 a very positive 
view of diet pills and that she was generally going 
to talk about the positive effects of diet pills. Dr. 
Jensen consented to the interview, and the two met 
at his office at Columbia FirstMed. 
% 11 Ms. Sawyers began the second meeting by 
confronting Dr. Jensen with the statements about 
diet drugs he had made when the two had met pre-
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viously. In response to his earlier remarks to Ms. 
Sawyers about Dexedrine, Dr. Jensen told Ms. Saw-
yers that he had contacted a few pharmacists and 
DOPL to obtain the rules and regulations for drug 
prescriptions. He told her that he was no longer 
able to "work with" her to obtain Dexedrine for 
weight loss. 
The First Broadcast 
f 12 On September 5, 1995, Channel 4, KTVX, and 
Ms. Sawyers aired the first report about Dr. 
Jensen. The report featured what it labeled 
"miracle diet pills" and asked "are doctors prescrib-
ing these pills too freely?" Ms. Sawyers told view-
ers that Dr. Jensen prescribed weight loss medica-
tions to her without examining her or asking if she 
had high blood pressure or diabetes, conditions 
which could be aggravated by the drugs Fastin and 
Pondimin. The broadcast also showed the hidden 
camera footage of Dr. Jensen admitting to Ms. Saw-
yers that he would be "willing to work" with her 
using Dexedrine, even though it was "technically 
not legal for that reason." The report concluded by 
showing a portion of Ms. Sawyers' interview with 
Mr. Robinson at DOPL. Mr. Robinson was shown 
telling Ms. Sawyers that the division was "very in-
terested in" looking into Dr. Jensen's license. Ms. 
Sawyers told viewers that the "State Division of Li-
censing and the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency 
[have] both opened investigations into Dr. Jensen's 
prescribing practices." 
FN1. For convenience, this report will be 
referred to as the September 5 report or the 
first broadcast. 
K 13 The next day, Columbia FirstMed terminated 
Dr. Jensen's employment and Mountain View Hos-
pital in Utah County revoked Dr. Jensen's priv-
ileges to practice medicine there. In addition, IHC 
Health Plans removed Dr. Jensen from its insurance 
panel due to his "unprofessional" and "possibly il-
legal" conduct that it believed had been disclosed in 
the September 5 KTVX broadcast. 
The Second Broadcast 
f 14 Nine months later, DOPL filed a petition 
against Dr. Jensen. The petition alleged that Dr. 
Jensen's treatment of Ms. Sawyers violated Utah 
Administrative Code rule 156-37-1 l(14)(a) and 
FN2 
(b), and that Dr. Jensen had engaged in unpro-
fessional conduct in violation of Utah Code section FN3 58-l-501(2)(a), (b), and (g). KTVX and Ms. 
Sawyers aired their second report about Dr. Jensen 
that same day, July 17, 1996. 
FN2. These rules address unprofessional 
conduct in prescribing, dispensing, and ad-
ministering controlled schedule III or IV 
drugs for the purpose of weight reduction. 
FN3. Section 58-1-501 defines unlawful 
and unprofessional conduct. Sections 2(a) 
and 2(b) prohibit aiding or abetting any 
other person to violate any law or profes-
sional/ethical standard, such as explaining 
to Ms. Sawyers how to abuse Fastin. Sec-
tion 2(g) relates to practicing a profession 
through gross incompetence, gross negli-
gence, or a pattern of incompetency or 
negligence. Utah Code Ann. § 
58-l-501(2)(a)-(b),(g)(1994). 
f 15 The second news broadcast told viewers that 
DOPL had filed a petition for unprofessional con-
duct against Dr. Jensen. The second broadcast also 
reviewed the assertion made in the first, specific-
ally, that Dr. Jensen had offered to "work with" Ms. 
Sawyers on illegally prescribing her Dexedrine. 
K 16 Later that year, Dr. Jensen settled the DOPL 
complaint. He admitted that he had "failed to com-
ply with some of the requirements" of Utah's Con-
trolled Substance Rules. Dr. Jensen agreed to a 
public reprimand, to meet quarterly with profes-
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sional licensing board members for one year, and to 
complete courses on proper prescribing practices 
and medical ethics. 
The Third Broadcast 
Tf 17 KTVX aired a third broadcast on November 6, 
1996. This broadcast highlighted problems with 
"questionable doctors" in Utah and gave viewers 
instructions to find *331 out which Utah doctors 
had been disciplined or who had received com-
plaints for unprofessional conduct. The broadcast 
named three physicians who had been censured, in-
cluding one physician who stood accused of sexu-
ally abusing a patient and another of performing il-
legal abortions. Then Ms. Sawyers asked viewers, 
"And what about Dr. Michael Jensen? In July 1995, 
we caught him on camera promising me illegal 
drugs for weight loss." She said that 
action has now been taken against Dr. Michael 
Jensen. He's the one we caught on tape promising 
me illegal drugs. The state will allow Jensen to 
keep his license but he'll receive a public reprim-
and which requires him to attend a workshop on 
proper prescribing and a course on medical eth-
ics. 
Procedural History of the Lawsuit 
<f 18 After the third broadcast, Dr. Jensen filed suit 
against Ms. Sawyers and KTVX ("defendants"). He 
sought relief under five causes of action: fraud and 
misrepresentation, intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations, negligent misrep-
resentation, defamation of character, and negli-
gence. Defendants moved for summary judgment to 
dismiss Dr. Jensen's claims of fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation. They also sought summary judg-
ment on Dr. Jensen's defamation claims relating to 
the first and second broadcasts, alleging they were 
barred by the one-year statute of limitations. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4). 
f 19 Dr. Jensen responded to the statute of limita-
tions defenses by seeking to amend his complaint to 
add four additional claims that would be immune to 
limitation challenges: (1) invasion of privacy/in-
trusion upon seclusion; (2) violation of state; (3) 
federal wiretapping laws; and (4) false light inva-
sion of privacy. 
K 20 The trial court granted defendants' summary 
judgment motion on the claims of fraud and negli-
gent misrepresentation and on the claim of defama-
tion as to the first and second broadcasts, but also 
permitted Dr. Jensen to amend his complaint. 
f 21 Defendants then brought a second round of 
motions seeking dismissal of the amended claims. 
Of the many contentions advanced in these motions 
only one is relevant to this appeal: that the one-year 
statute of limitations for defamation should apply to 
Dr. Jensen's false light invasion of privacy claim. 
The trial court denied that motion, and the case 
went to trial. 
K 22 The jury returned a verdict for Dr. Jensen for 
false light invasion of privacy on the first and 
second broadcasts and awarded him $520,000 in 
economic damages, $85,000 in general damages, 
and $245,300 in punitive damages. Ruling separ-
ately on the third broadcast, the jury also returned a 
verdict for Dr. Jensen for false light invasion of pri-
vacy and defamation and awarded Dr. Jensen $1 
million for economic loss, $500,000 in general 
damages, and $450,600 in punitive damages. The 
jury also found for Dr. Jensen on his common law 
intrusion on seclusion and violation of privacy 
claims and awarded him $90,000. Last, the jury 
found for Dr. Jensen on his tortious interference 
claim and awarded him $25,000 in general damages 
and $25,000 in punitive damages. 
| 23 The trial court granted defendants' motion to 
alter the judgment, finding that the jury's award of 
damages for common law intrusion on seclusion 
duplicated the award for statutory violations, and 
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reduced the three awards by $180,000 to a single 
award of $90,000. 
f 24 Ms. Sawyers and KTVX appealed. They attrib-
ute multiple errors to the trial court. First, they as-
sert that the one-year statute of limitations that 
barred Dr. Jensen's defamation claims based on the 
first and second broadcasts should also bar his false 
light invasion of privacy claims. 
f 25 Next, they challenge the jury's false light inva-
sion of privacy verdict stemming from the third 
broadcast on the grounds that all of the information 
disclosed in the third broadcast concerned Dr. 
Jensen's professional affairs and was, therefore, not 
actionable as an invasion of privacy. 
f 26 For similar reasons, defendants take issue with 
the verdict awarding Dr. Jensen damages for intru-
sion on seclusion and violations of Utah privacy 
protection statutes, insisting that Ms. Sawyers' sur-
reptitious taping *332 of Dr. Jensen did not take 
place under circumstances that amounted to an in-
vasion of Dr. Jensen's privacy. 
f 27 Fourth, defendants challenge the defamation 
verdict for Dr. Jensen on the third broadcast be-
cause its contents were substantially true. 
f 28 Fifth, defendants challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting the jury's award of eco-
nomic damages tied to the third broadcast. 
K 29 Last, defendants claim that insufficient evid-
ence exists to sustain the jury's punitive damages 
award. 
f 30 For his part, Dr. Jensen cross-appeals four is-
sues. We will address three of his claims: that the 
court was too restrictive in awarding him attorney 
fees, that he should be awarded all of his claimed 
costs because of rule 54(d)(2), and that his costs 
were "necessary disbursements." His fourth cross-
appeal on reduction of damages is absorbed in our 
section focusing on the common law seclusion 
claim. 
ANALYSIS 
I. FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY AND 
DEFAMATION SHARE THE SAME STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS 
[1] Tf 31 We first take up defendants' claim that Dr. 
Jensen's recovery for false light invasion of privacy 
based on the first two broadcasts must be vacated 
because the one-year statute of limitations for de-
FN4 famation governs claims for false light inva-
sion of privacy, and Dr. Jensen filed his complaint 
more than one year after the broadcasts aired. The 
trial court ruled as a matter of law that the tort of 
defamation was sufficiently different from false 
light invasion of privacy to place it beyond the 
reach of defamation's statute of limitations. The tri-
al court reasoned that since no statute of limitations 
expressly applies to invasion of privacy torts, Dr. 
Jensen's false light invasion of privacy claim fell 
within the ambit of Utah's four-year "catch-all" 
statute of limitations "for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25(3) (2000).FN5 
FN4. Utah Code section 78-12-29(4) states 
that "[a]n action may be brought within 
one year ... for libel, slander, [or] assault." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4) (2000). 
FN5. The trial court made its affirmative 
ruling that Dr. Jensen's false light invasion 
of privacy claims were not time-barred in 
the context of denying defendants' motion 
for summary judgment seeking dismissal 
of the claims on statute of limitations 
grounds. Dr. Jensen contends that this is-
sue was not preserved for appeal because, 
presumably, defendants did not reassert 
their statute of limitations claim at trial. To 
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do so would have been futile. The fashion 
in which the trial court chose to deny de-
fendants' summary judgment motion left 
nothing regarding the statute of limitations 
to be decided at trial. The trial court ruling, 
which established the law of the case on 
the question of the applicable statute of 
limitations, was therefore preserved. 
f 32 We now assess anew the legal question of 
whether false light invasion of privacy enjoys a de-
gree of kinship with defamation so close as to war-
rant a sharing of limitations periods. This undertak-
ing of legal taxonomy requires that we examine the 
features of both torts to identify what characterist-
ics, if any, they have in common. We must assess 
the relationship between the two claims in the con-
text of the text and purpose of section 78-12-25(3). 
[2][3][4][5] f 33 We begin with an examination of 
the relevant statutory provisions. The legislature 
has assigned a one-year limitations period to ac-
tions for libel and slander. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-29(4). The United States District Court for 
Utah has predicted that we could rule that this one-
year limitations period applies to defamation ac-
tions. Watkins v. Gen. Refractories Co., 805 
F.Supp. 911,917 (D.Utah 1992). Today we confirm 
the accuracy of this prediction. The second relevant 
statute is Utah's "catch-all" provision which estab-
lishes a four-year limitations period "for relief not 
otherwise provided*333 for by law." Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-25(3). 
FN6. Slander and libel are a subset of de-
famation. "Slander consists of the publica-
tion of defamatory matter by spoken 
words, transitory gestures or by any form 
of communication other than [libel]." Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 568(2) 
(1977). "Libel consists of the publication 
of defamatory matter by written or printed 
words ... in physical form or by any other 
form of communication that has the poten-
tially harmful qualities characteristic of 
written or printed words." Id. § 568(1). 
[6] K 34 In assessing which of these two statutory 
provisions applies to Dr. Jensen's false light inva-
sion of privacy claims, we pay little heed to the la-
bels placed on a particular claim, favoring instead 
an evaluation based on the essence and substance of 
the claim. See Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bon-
neville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 14 (Utah 1990) 
(noting that whether a claim exists should be based 
on the "nature of the action and not the pleading la-
bels chosen"). Applying this approach to Dr. 
Jensen's claims, we hold that they are properly clas-
sified as defamation claims and thus fall within the 
one-year limitation imposed by section 78-12-29. 
[7] f 35 Defamation is the act of harming the repu-
tation of another by making a false statement to a 
third person. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 
P.2d 999, 1007 (Utah 1994) ("To state a claim for 
defamation, [one] must show that defendants pub-
lished the statements concerning him, that the state-
ments were false, defamatory, and not subject to 
any privilege, that the statements were published 
with the requisite degree of fault, and that their 
publication resulted in damage."). This is what Dr. 
Jensen said defendants did to him in his initial com-
plaint. When the trial court dismissed his defama-
tion claims on the first and second broadcasts be-
cause they were filed too late, Dr. Jensen amended 
his complaint to frame defendants' alleged mis-
deeds as false light invasion of privacy. The con-
duct Dr. Jensen complained of under this theory 
was the same, only the legal grounds for his griev-
ances were different. We now turn to an examina-
tion of Dr. Jensen's alternative legal grounds for re-
lief: false light invasion of privacy. 
f 36 American jurisprudence has long recognized 
the tort of invasion of privacy. Pavesich v. New 
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 
(1905); see also Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years 
of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L.Rev. 1335, 1353 (1992) 
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(listing the first invasion of privacy cases: ''Marks 
v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y. Sup.Ct. 908 (1893) (publishing of 
picture of an actor, without consent, in newspaper 
popularity contest enjoined); Mackenzie v. Soden 
Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup.Ct. 1891) 
(use of physician's name in advertising medicine, 
without consent); Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 
280 (C.C.D.Mass.1894) (publishing biography and 
portrait of George H. Corliss, deceased inventor, 
not an invasion of privacy because he was a public 
figure; [the] opinion may be read to suggest, 
however, that right to privacy exists)"). The genesis 
of the tort of invasion of privacy in the United 
States is generally traced to an 1890 law review art-
icle authored by law partners Samuel D. Warren 
and Louis D. Brandeis in The Right to Privacy, 4 
Harv.L.Rev. 193(1890). 
f 37 The jury returned a verdict finding both KTVX 
and Ms. Sawyers liable under multiple claims. 
Based on its findings of liability, the jury awarded 
Dr. Jensen general damages, damages for economic 
loss, and punitive damages. The trial court entered 
a seven-page, thirty-paragraph judgment detailing 
the various damages awards and their allocations. 
We will undertake to summarize the damages 
awards in a condensed form that includes only the 
damages awards subject to the challenges raised in 
this appeal. We will not describe the allocations of 
the various awards between Ms. Sawyers and 
KTVX as only the aggregate damages awards are 
affected by our rulings. 
f 38 The jury was asked to consider separately Dr. 
Jensen's false light invasion of privacy claims 
arising from the combined first and second broad-
casts and those linked to the third broadcast. This 
organizational scheme permitted the jury to con-
sider separately Dr. Jensen's defamation claim tied 
to the third broadcast, a claim that unlike his de-
famation claims associated with the first and second 
broadcasts, had not been extinguished by the statute 
of limitations. 
f 39 The jury awarded Dr. Jensen economic loss 
damages totaling $600,000, general damages of 
$100,000, and punitive damages of $245,300 based 
on defendants' liability for false light invasion of 
privacy on the first and second broadcasts. 
\ 40 Defendants' liability for defamation and false 
light invasion of privacy arising from the third 
broadcast resulted in an *334 award of economic 
loss damages of $1 million, general damages of 
$500,000, and punitive damages of $450,600. 
% 41 The jury awarded Dr. Jensen $50,000 in gener-
al damages and $40,000 in punitive damages 
arising from defendants' liability under common 
law intrusion upon seclusion. The jury awarded a 
like $90,000 aggregate sum to Dr. Jensen on each 
of two of the three state statutory claims. 
f 42 The trial court supplemented its judgment with 
an award of costs to Dr. Jensen totaling $7,412.46, 
and attorney fees in the amount of $75,058.50. 
% 43 In 1960, Dean Prosser surveyed the invasion 
of privacy landscape and could not identify an in-
ternally consistent or coherent formulation of pri-
vacy based torts. He summarized the state of the 
privacy tort law this way: 
What has emerged from the decisions is no simple 
matter. It is not one tort, but a complex of four. 
The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds 
of invasion of four different interests of the 
plaintiff, which are tied together by the common 
name, but otherwise have almost nothing in com-
mon except that each represents an interference 
with the right of the plaintiff, in the phrase coined 
by Judge Cooley, "to be let alone." Without any 
attempt to exact definition, these four torts may 
be described as follows: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or 
solitude, or into his private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts 
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about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false 
light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, 
of the plaintiffs name or likeness. 
It should be obvious at once that these four types 
of invasion may be subject, in some respects at 
least, to different rules; and that when what is 
said as to any one of them is carried over to an-
other, it may not be at all applicable, and confu-
sion may follow. 
Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broad Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 
477 (Mo. 1986) (quoting Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. 
L.Rev. 382, 389 (I960)). 
f 44 The second restatement of torts modified its 
approach to invasion of privacy to accommodate 
Dean Prosser's critique and proposed reforms. We, 
in turn, have fashioned our invasion of privacy jur-
isprudence around the second restatement. Russell 
v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 
906-07 (Utah 1992). 
K 45 False light invasion of privacy entered English 
common law by an aggrieved Lord Byron. Protect-
ive of his reputation as a poet-his reputation for his 
nonpoetic behavior was controversial and, to many, 
beyond redemption-Byron successfully appealed to 
the British courts to stay publication of a "spurious 
and inferior poem attributed to him." Prosser, supra 
f 43, at 398 (citing Lord Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 
29, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816)). Although Byron's 
grievance sprang from his concern for his literary 
reputation, false light invasion of privacy does not 
necessarily provide redress for injury to a person's 
reputation. Instead, like each of the varieties of in-
vasion of privacy, it owes its existence to the value 
society places on the right to be left alone. As we 
noted in Russell, it is because false light invasion of 
privacy protects a different interest than defamation 
that we have granted it status as an independent 
tort. 842 P.2d at 907. As we will discuss shortly, 
the difference in the interests protected by the two 
torts is an insufficient reason, particularly under the 
facts of this case, to justify the application of a sep-
arate statute of limitations to defamation and false 
light invasion of privacy. 
[8] 1 46 An actionable portrayal of a person in a 
false light may or may not include the communica-
tion of defamatory information about the victim. As 
the examples in the Restatement illustrate, a person 
may conceivably be placed in a false light through 
the dissemination of praiseworthy but untrue in-
formation about that person, if a reasonable person 
would find the information highly objectionable. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, illus. 9 
(1977); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining and 
Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light Invasion of 
Privacy, *335 41 Case W. Res. 885, 896 (1991) 
(reasoning that where nondisparaging false state-
ments are disseminated about a person, "unless 
nondisparaging false statements actually rise to the 
level of highly offensive, the harm they bring about 
may not be substantial enough to justify all the 
costs involved in the recognition and administration 
of a false light tort" and advancing this contention, 
among others, to support his conclusion that false 
light as a distinct tort claim should be "significantly 
narrowed"). 
% 47 Whether false light invasion of privacy should 
maintain its place within the invasion of privacy 
canon is a question that has stimulated spirited de-
bate among courts and commentators. As of 2002, 
"thirty state courts acknowledge false light as a vi-
able claim in their jurisdictions." Denver 
PuhVg Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 897 (2002) 
(citing in part Bueno v. Denver Publ'g Co., 32 P.3d 
491, 495 (Colo.Ct.App.2000)). Several states have 
either rejected the cause of action entirely or have 
not reached the issue because the facts of the case 
did not merit a review of false light invasion of pri-
vacy. Id. Twelve states have declined invitations to 
expressly welcome false light to join their invasion 
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of privacy jurisprudence. Id.; see also Cain v. 
Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 586 (Tex.1994). 
The Colorado Supreme Court aptly characterized 
false light invasion of privacy as " 'the least-
recognized and most controversial aspect of inva-
sion of privacy.' " Denver Publ'g Co., 54 P.3d at 
897 (quoting Cain, 878 S.W.2d at 579). In doing 
so, the Colorado court also referenced various au-
thorities' contentions that false light invasion of pri-
vacy's position as a distinct tort claim is tenuous at 
best. Id. at 898. 
FN7. Doe v. Roe, 638 So.2d 826 
(Ala. 1994); Godbehere v. Phoenix News-
papers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 783 P.2d 781 
(1989); Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265 
Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert, 
denied sub nom. Little Rock Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Dodrill, AAA U.S. 1076, 100 S.Ct. 
1024, 62 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980); Fellows v. 
Natl Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal.3d 234, 228 
Cal.Rptr. 215, 721 P.2d 97 (1986); 
Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., 
Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317 
(1982); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 
A.2d 773 (Del.1963); Agency for Health 
Care Admin, v. Assoc. Indus. ofFla., Inc., 
678 So.2d 1239 (Fla.1996); Cabaniss v. 
Hipsley, 114 Ga.App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496 
(1966); Hoskins v. Howard, 132 Idaho 311, 
971 P.2d 1135 (1998); Lovgren v. Citizens 
First Nat'l Bank, 126 I11.2d 411, 128 
Ill.Dec. 542, 534 N.E.2d 987 (1989); Win-
egard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816 (Iowa 
1977); Dotson v. McLaughlin, 216 Kan. 
201, 531 P.2d 1 (1975); McCall v. Couri-
er-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 
S.W.2d 882 (Ky.1981), cert, denied, 456 
U.S. 975, 102 S.Ct. 2239, 72 L.Ed.2d 849 
(1982); Perere v. Louisiana Tel. Broad. 
Corp., 721 So.2d 1075 (La.Ct.App.1998); 
Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 
1223 (Me. 1977); Harnish v. Herald-Mail 
Co., 264 Md. 326, 286 A.2d 146 (1972); 
Deitz v. Wometco W. Mich. TV, 160 
Mich.App. 367, 407 N.W.2d 649 (1987); 
Bd. of Dentistry v. Kandarian, 268 Mont. 
408, 886 P.2d 954 (1994); Turner v. Welli-
ver, 226 Neb. 275, 411 N.W.2d 298 (1987) 
(citing false light invasion of privacy as 
codified in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 20-204 
(1983)); Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 
282, 537 A.2d 284 (1988); Moore v. Sun 
Publ'g Corp., 118 N.M. 375, 881 P.2d 735 
(1994), cert, denied, 118 N.M. 430, 882 
P.2d 21 (1994); McCormack v. Okla. 
Publ'g Co., 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980); 
Dean v. Guard Publ'g Co., 73 Or.App. 
656, 699 P.2d 1158 (1985); Larsen v. Phil-
adelphia Newspapers, Inc., 375 Pa.Super. 
66, 543 A.2d 1181 (Pa.Super.Ct.1988); 
Montgomery Ward v. Shope, 286 N.W.2d 
806 (S.D.I979); West v. Media Gen. Con-
vergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640 
(Tenn.2001); Russell v. Thomson Newspa-
pers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992); Lem-
nah v. Am. Breeders Serv., Inc., 144 Vt. 
568, 482 A.2d 700 (1984); Eastwood v. 
Cascade Broad. Co., 106 Wash.2d 466, 
722 P.2d 1295 (1986); Crump v. Beckley 
Newspapers, Inc., 173 W.Va. 699, 320 
S.E.2d70(1983). 
f 48 Critics of false light invasion of privacy point 
to its substantial areas of overlap with defamation 
as a sound reason not to legitimize it. See, e.g., 
Schwartz, supra f 46, at 887 (reasoning that a 
"false [light] statement disparages the plaintiffs 
conduct or character. If it is disparaging, however, 
the plaintiff evidently has a defamation action 
against the defendant"). 
t 49 Both defamation and false light invasion of 
privacy provide legal redress for uninvited notori-
ety grounded in falsehoods caused by the defend-
ant. Despite certain dissimilarities between defama-
tion and false light invasion of privacy, such as the 
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requirement that false information be publicized 
more widely to be actionable under false light inva-
sion of privacy than is necessary to sustain an ac-
tion in defamation, and the possibility*336 that 
highly offensive but nondefamatory statements 
could provide adequate grounds for a claim of false 
light invasion of privacy, false light invasion of pri-
vacy and defamation have much in common. The 
differences between the two claims are at their mar-
gins. It is important to note, however, that Dr. 
Jensen's claims do not occupy these margins. The 
operative facts of his false light invasion of privacy 
claims allege defamation. In fact, they are the same 
facts he pleaded under his defamation causes of ac-
tion that were dismissed as untimely. 
FN8. Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Corp., 
351 Mass. 53, 217 N.E.2d 736 (1966) 
(holding that publication to one person is 
sufficient to maintain action for defama-
tion). But see Russell, 842 P.2d at 907 
(requiring that a false light invasion of pri-
vacy claim center on " 4[o]ne who gives 
publicity to a matter concerning another 
that places the other before the public [i.e., 
more than one person] in a false light is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion 
of his privacy' " (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 652E)). 
^ 50 Defamation claims always reside in the shad-
ow of the First Amendment. Because of its maturity 
within the common law, defamation jurisprudence 
has, over time, largely found a way to co-exist with 
the demands placed on it by the freedom of speech. 
In reaching an accommodation consistent with free-
dom of speech, defamation has accumulated a con-
siderable assortment of defenses, privileges, 
heightened burdens of proof, and particularized 
standards of review. 
% 51 The concern that claims like false light inva-
sion of privacy with close ties to defamation might 
be prosecuted free of the First Amendment safe-
guards present in defamation actions has drawn the 
attention of both the drafters of the Restatements 
and this court. This issue is taken up in a comment 
to section 652E of the Restatement, which notes: 
When the false publicity is also defamatory so that 
either action can be maintained by the plaintiff, it 
is arguable that limitations of long standing that 
have been found desirable for the action for de-
famation should not be successfully evaded by 
proceeding upon a different theory of later origin, 
in the development of which the attention of the 
courts has not been directed to the limitations. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, cmt. e 
(1977). 
K 52 We responded to a similar concern when we 
held that Utah's statutory "fair report" privilege, 
nominally applicable to allegations of defamation, 
extended to a claim of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress tied to the same operative facts that 
gave rise to defamation claims brought by a nurse 
against a reporter and newspaper. Russell, 842 P.2d 
at 902-03. We underscored our holding with cita-
tions to cases that applied shorter statutes of limita-
tion for defamation and libel to causes of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and false 
light invasion of privacy that were tied to defamat-
ory statements. Id at 906 n. 37. 
f 53 We are persuaded that the statute of limitations 
cases used in Russell to buttress the merits of ap-
plying the fair report privilege to a cause of action 
closely allied to defamation are equally persuasive 
for the actual propositions they advance: that the 
statute of limitations for defamation governs claims 
based on the same operative facts that would sup-
port a defamation action. In recognition of the pos-
sibility that a false light invasion of privacy claim 
may turn on operative facts that do not include de-
famation, we further limit our holding to the facts 
present here and extend the one-year limit to false 
light invasion claims that flow from allegedly de-
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famatory statements. 
K 54 Several additional considerations contribute to 
our conviction of the soundness of this holding. Be-
cause, as this case clearly attests, virtually any de-
famation claim may be recast as an action for false 
light invasion of privacy, were we to assign 
"catch-all" status to false light invasion of privacy 
we would effectively neuter the one-year defama-
tion limitation. An express one-year statutory limit-
ations period for defamation stands as the implied 
product of the legislature's consideration of the 
various policy considerations that inform the span 
of time appropriate to bring an action. 
f 55 A shorter limitations period for defamation can 
be explained and justified as an acknowledgment of 
importance of the free speech interests with which 
defamation collides. A shorter defamation period 
reflects the importance placed on freedom of 
speech by restricting the time those making state-
ments *337 are exposed to legal challenges, thereby 
reducing the chilling effect on speech that may ac-
company the prospect of defending statements well 
beyond their shelf lives. By encouraging persons 
aggrieved by allegedly defamatory statements to 
bring claims promptly, a shorter limitations period 
also increases the opportunities for defendants to 
take prompt and meaningful remedial steps to mit-
igate a plaintiffs damages by, for example, publish-
ing retractions. 
f 56 The characterization of section 78-12-25(3) as 
a "catch-all" carries with it the implication that 
none of the claims captured by it will have enjoyed 
the benefit of an individualized assessment of an 
appropriate statute of limitations. Therefore in light 
of strong affinity between defamation and Dr. 
Jensen's false light invasion of privacy claims based 
on defendants' defamatory statements, the assign-
ment of those claims to the more fully reasoned 
statutory category is superior to casting the claim 
into the "catch-all" classification and disregarding 
all consequences of the substantial commonality of 
the claims. 
K 57 We have not been asked to re-evaluate the 
status of false light invasion of privacy in the tort 
law of our state. Moreover, our discussion of the re-
lationship between defamation and false light inva-
sion of privacy should not be interpreted as an in-
vitation to reconsider the viability of false light in-
vasion of privacy. We remain sufficiently per-
suaded that there is certain unacceptable conduct 
that could be within the reach of false light invasion 
of privacy, but not defamation. Rather, our discus-
sion bears on the narrow issue of whether the de-
famation statute of limitations should apply to 
claims of false light invasion of privacy. 
f 58 We are cautious about describing in any detail 
the scope or contours of actions for false light inva-
sion of privacy that do not involve allegations of 
defamatory statements. These are not relevant here. 
Dr. Jensen's false light invasion of privacy claims 
are tied to the same operative facts that grounded 
his defamation claims. Accordingly, we vacate the 
verdicts relating to false light invasion of privacy 
on the first and second broadcasts. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
PLAIN ERROR BY SUBMITTING THE FALSE 
LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM ON 
THE THIRD BROADCAST TO THE JURY 
[9] T 59 Dr. Jensen's claim of false light invasion of 
privacy linked to the third broadcast, which aired 
November 6, 1996, was not vulnerable to a statute 
of limitations challenge. Defendants nevertheless 
challenge this portion of the jury verdict, asserting 
that the verdict was the product of the trial court's 
plain error. 
f 60 According to defendants, the jury was improp-
erly permitted to consider as actionable false light 
portrayals of activities that related exclusively to 
Dr. Jensen's professional life. Defendants assert 
that because only matters of a personal nature can 
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form the basis for false light invasion of privacy, 
the depiction of Dr. Jensen's meeting with Ms. 
Sawyers could not have formed the basis for recov-
ery under a false light theory. Defendants did not, 
however, offer a jury instruction on this point. 
[10] f 61 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51(d) bars 
appellate consideration of unpreserved defects in 
jury instructions "except to avoid manifest in-
justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 51(d). We have interpreted 
manifest injustice to be synonymous with plain er-
ror and that the same analytical model applies to 
each. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 
799 (Utah 1991). The plain error test has three 
parts: the demonstration of error; a qualitative 
showing that the error was plain, manifest, or obvi-
ous to the trial court; and evidence that the error af-
fected the substantial rights of a party. State v. Ca-
sey, 2003 UT 55, fflf 42-50, 82 P.3d 1106. 
% 62 We are not persuaded that the trial court erred 
when it did not include within the text of its in-
structions on the elements of false light invasion of 
privacy a statement that the disclosures made about 
Dr. Jensen in the broadcasts must have concerned 
his private affairs, as distinguished from his person-
al life. The instruction given by the trial court in-
cluded a verbatim recitation of the elements of false 
light invasion of privacy as set out in section 652E 
of the Restatement. *338 Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 652E (1977). Moreover, comment a to this 
section states: 
The form of invasion of privacy covered by the rule 
stated in this Section does not depend upon mak-
ing public any facts concerning the private life of 
the individual. On the contrary, it is essential to 
the rule stated in this Section that the matter pub-
lished concerning the plaintiff is not true. 
Id. at cmt. a. 
K 63 Inasmuch as we have endorsed the Restate-
ment approach to invasion of privacy torts, Russell 
v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 907 
(Utah 1992); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 
(Utah 1988), the trial court would have acted con-
trary to this comment and likely committed error if 
it had instructed the jury that to recover for false 
light invasion of privacy, Dr. Jensen must show that 
the broadcast portrayed private information about 
him. Accordingly, we reject this challenge to the 
third broadcast. 
III. DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED 
GROUNDS TO DISTURB THE JURY'S VER-
DICT ON DR. JENSEN'S INTRUSION UPON SE-
CLUSION CLAIM 
[11][12] 1 64 Defendants next claim that the jury's 
verdict awarding Dr. Jensen damages for the intru-
sion upon seclusion species of invasion of privacy 
must be vacated. This common law claim is closely 
allied with Utah's statutory privacy protections that 
safeguard citizens against eavesdropping and com-
munication abuse. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-402 
(2003). The jury found that defendants had violated 
section 76-9-402(1 )(a) to (c) and awarded Dr. 
Jensen damages. Defendants claim that the 
jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Jensen for the statutory 
claims must, like the verdict on the intrusion and 
seclusion claim, be reversed. We disagree. 
FN9. Defendants argue in a footnote that it 
is impossible for United Television to be 
liable under section 76-9-402(1 Xa) if Ms. 
Sawyers is not also liable. However, de-
fendants fail to preserve or brief this issue, 
and therefore, we will not address it. 
FN 10. However, we agree that the trial 
court properly reduced the compensatory 
and punitive damages on the gathering of 
information claims. We therefore reject Dr. 
Jensen's cross-appeal seeking reinstate-
ment of the damages. 
f 65 We begin our analysis of this portion of de-
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fendants' appeal by addressing a recurring theme: 
standard of review. The manner in which the parties 
have articulated the standard of review concerning 
this component of their appeal provides a useful 
framework to examine the standard of review issues 
implicated here, even though defendants reach the 
wrong conclusions about which standard should ap-
ply-an error of considerable consequence. 
f 66 In their brief, defendants assert that "the dis-
trict court erred when it denied summary judgment 
and submitted to the jury, and did not set aside the 
verdict on, Dr. Jensen's three alternative claims as-
serting an invasion of his privacy." By framing the 
issue in this way, defendants invite us to consider 
three separate occasions upon which the trial court 
had an opportunity, and in defendants' view the ob-
ligation, to dispose of Dr. Jensen's intrusion on se-
clusion tort claim and its statutory companions. By 
treating these events collectively, defendants imply 
that the same standard of review applies to each. 
According to defendants, that standard of review is 
a nondeferential de novo reconsideration of the re-
cord. Defendants do not attempt to explain why de 
novo review is uniformly applicable to a review of 
rulings on summary judgment, directed verdict, and 
the jury's verdict itself, nor do they cite any author-
ity in support of this proposition. 
f 67 It is beyond the scope of this appeal and not 
necessary to its outcome to note that different 
standards of review apply to appeals from rulings 
on motions for summary judgment, motions for a 
directed verdict, and motions for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. Nor need we do more than ob-
serve that appellate review of trial court denials of 
these motions are treated differently than review of 
motions granted. We likewise decline to take up the 
unbriefed question of whether it is appropriate to 
consider an appeal of a motion for a directed ver-
dict that was improperly denied, thereby allowing a 
*339 matter of law to be submitted to a jury. See, 
e.g., R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 
1506, 1515 (Fed.Cir.1984) (holding that it is 
"neither error nor dangerous to justice to submit 
legal issues to juries"); Tights, Inc. v. Acme-Mc-
Crary Corp., 541 F.2d 1047, 1060 (4th Cir.1976) 
(holding that sending a matter of law to the jury 
was not error because it ultimately "involves under-
lying questions of fact" and because "the formula-
tion of issues is a matter resting in the sound discre-
tion of the trial court" (citations omitted)). 
\ 68 Defendants insist that we conduct a free-
ranging review of the jury's verdict on these com-
mon law and statutory privacy claims because the 
jury was called upon to apply an objective standard 
in evaluating whether Dr. Jensen had a sufficiently 
cognizable privacy interest. Without a legitimate 
privacy interest, Dr. Jensen could not have estab-
lished the first element of the tort of intrusion on 
seclusion, which requires that a defendant "intrude 
[ ] into a private place, or otherwise invadef ] a 
private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about 
his person or affairs." Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 652B, cmt c (1977). The absence of a legit-
imate privacy interest would also be fatal to Dr. 
Jensen's statutory claims. Utah's privacy and com-
munication abuse statute conditions actionable con-
duct on an invasion of a "private place" which is 
defined as "a place where one may reasonably be 
safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveil-
lance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-401(1). 
\ 69 Whether Dr. Jensen enjoyed an actionable pri-
vacy interest was to be evaluated objectively, meas-
ured by the expectation of a reasonable person. Ac-
cording to defendants, the jury's use of an objective 
standard to assess privacy exposes this verdict to 
more rigorous appellate scrutiny. We disagree. 
[13] \ 70 The calculation of the proper measure of 
discretion to parcel out to a jury has virtually noth-
ing to do with the fact that an objective standard is 
used to evaluate the presence or absence of a 
plaintiffs privacy interest. One need look no further 
than the law of negligence to confirm this point. 
Like the entitlement to privacy, the presence or ab-
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sence of negligence is gauged objectively, meas-
ured by society's expectations for the behavior of 
the mythical "reasonable person." In our state, like 
virtually every other jurisdiction in our country, the 
question of whether a defendant's conduct fell be-
low a particular standard of care is one to be de-
cided by the jury. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gribble, 30 
Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432, 434 (1973) ("The rights 
and duties of drivers approaching intersections are 
questions dealing with the standard of conduct to be 
expected of a reasonably prudent man and are pecu-
liarly a matter for the jury."); Hone v. Mammoth 
Mining Co., 27 Utah 168, 75 P. 381, 384 (1904) 
(holding that questions of "ordinary care" are sub-
ject to different interpretations and are therefore ap-
propriate matters for a jury). 
f 71 Despite the fact that the application of object-
ive legal standards has long been counted among 
the jury's tasks, defendants' assertion that an object-
ive standard and nondeferential review are some-
how connected is not farfetched. Indeed, the two 
concepts are linked to one another in a manner that 
becomes clear when they are viewed through the 
lens of the law versus fact standard of review as-
sessment model. This model, which we explored in 
exacting detail in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
1994), is the source in our case law of the often in-
voked "pasture fence" metaphor. See, e.g., State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, U 13, 103 P.3d 699; Alta Pac. 
Assocs. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 931 P.2d 103, 
109 (Utah 1997); State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 
282 (Utah 1994). 
% 72 In the bipolar law versus fact world, objective 
standards appear to display the attributes of legal 
constructs that are subject to unconstrained appel-
late review. It is not readily apparent, therefore, 
why a jury's application of an objective standard in 
its deliberations should mandate deferential appel-
late review. 
% 73 Judge Learned Hand confronted this paradox 
when attempting to explain why the objectively 
evaluated question of negligence is submitted to the 
jury. He wrote: "[I]n cases tried to a jury it is in-
deed treated [as a question of fact], although obvi-
ously it is not a question of fact, for it measures the 
duty and liability which the law imposes." *34QSid-
ney Blumenthal & Co. v. Atl. Coastline Rail Co., 
139 F.2d 288, 290 (2d Cir.1943), cert, denied, 321 
U.S. 795, 64 S.Ct. 848, 88 L.Ed. 1084 (1944). The 
complicating truth at the heart of Judge Hand's ob-
servation is that even matters that would be tradi-
tionally understood as legal issues will be treated as 
questions of fact when presented to a jury. 
% 74 To the extent that Pena describes a two-
dimensional standard of review universe that can be 
navigated using the coordinates of law and fact, the 
treatment of objective standards in jury trials ex-
poses its limitations. 869 P.2d at 939. Settling on a 
proper standard of review is about more than dis-
criminating fact from law. Such a two-dimensional 
interpretation does not account for other important 
review considerations which lend breadth and depth 
to the review selection enterprise. 
1 75 A comparison of Pena with this case illustrates 
the point. At issue in Pena was the proper standard 
by which to review a trial court's determination of 
whether a police stop was supported by reasonable 
suspicion. 869 P.2d at 934-35. The issue presented 
a classic mixed question of law and fact. Id. The 
circumstances surrounding Mr. Pena's detention 
were factual. Id. The concept of reasonable suspi-
cion was legal. Id. The application of the reason-
able suspicion standard to the circumstances of Mr. 
Pena's detention intertwined both elements. Id. at 
936. 
% 16 The focus of our inquiry in Pena was where to 
place the reasonable suspicion inquiry on the fact 
versus law continuum. Id. at 939. Here, however, 
we are reviewing a jury verdict. This enterprise 
does not lend itself to the task of measuring the ra-
tio of law to fact, positioning the result along a lin-
ear scale, and applying the measure of discretion 
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assigned to that particular point. Instead, a jury ver-
dict, even a special verdict that incorporates a jury's 
answers to detailed components of a claim, will sel-
dom lend itself to a Pena-like analysis because the 
variety of options for the application of discretion 
is not available when reviewing a jury verdict. 
Rather, once it is determined that a matter has been 
properly submitted to the jury, the question on re-
view almost inevitably becomes the factual one of 
whether there was substantial evidence to support 
the outcome. 
1 77 Defendants' argument is more accurately un-
derstood as a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence. In other words, defendants contend that 
Dr. Jensen presented insufficient evidence-evidence 
that fell short of the substantial evidence standard 
necessary to support a jury verdict-to meet the 
proper legal standard for an environment into which 
an intrusion would be actionable. According to de-
fendants, the uncontroverted facts established that 
the clinic was open to the public and that Dr. 
Jensen and Ms. Sawyers occupied the examination 
room in a professional, rather than private, capa-
city. 
[14] f 78 Defendants can certainly point to cases 
which have attempted to set up identifiable land-
marks to mark the boundaries of a private environ-
ment which should be legally protected from intru-
sion. For example, subject to certain limitations, the 
work place enjoys lesser privacy protections than a 
dwelling. See, e.g., Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 20 
Cal.4th 907, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 909, 978 P.2d 67, 74 
(1999) (holding that "an employee may, under 
some circumstances, have a reasonable expectation 
of visual or aural privacy against electronic intru-
sion by a stranger, despite the possibility that the 
conversations and interactions at issue could be 
witnessed by coworkers or the employer"); Dietem-
ann v. Time, Inc., 284 F.Supp. 925, 926-31 
(C.D.Cal.1968), affd, 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir.1971) 
(The plaintiff was engaged in practicing simple 
quackery out of his home. Reporters from Life 
Magazine met with the plaintiff at his home and ob-
tained pictures under the guise that they were re-
ferred to him by a friend. Instead the reporters 
worked with the Los Angeles District Attorney's of-
fice to get information about the plaintiffs practice 
and take pictures, which led to his arrest. The re-
porters also used a hidden radio transmitter to trans-
mit the dialogue to a van. The pictures and a story 
about the plaintiff were subsequently published in 
Life Magazine. The Ninth Circuit held that this con-
stituted an invasion of the plaintiffs privacy, writ-
ing, "It can hardly be concluded that plaintiffs 
activities in his house, whether in the presence of 
one or *341 several people, are activities in the 
public view for the purpose of publication."). At the 
same time, as the Sanders court noted, the concept 
of privacy "is not a binary all or nothing character-
istic." Sanders, 978 P.2d at 72. 
[15] t 79 We agree with the Sanders court that 
whether a person is entitled to solitude of seclusion 
is a relative and highly fact-dependent matter. The 
plastic nature of privacy is not at odds with the use 
of an objective standard to evaluate its existence. 
Rather, it is a recognition that reasonable people 
may find a legally protectable private environment 
in a multiple and varied array of physical settings. 
f 80 We should be wary of using our appellate au-
thority to attempt on a case-by-case basis to define 
with precision the boundaries of a reasonable 
sphere of protected privacy. Such an undertaking 
carries with it the risk of creating more problems 
than it would solve. 
^[81 Justice Zimmerman, in Pena, recounted an ex-
ample of the dangers of being overly eager to put 
too high a polish on fact-dependent legal doctrines, 
citing our experience with the law of waiver. 869 
P.2d at 938. As Justice Zimmerman explained: 
In a series of earlier cases, we have ruled that 
waiver was or was not present as a matter of law 
on the specific facts of those cases. This entailed 
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fairly close scrutiny of the application of the gen-
eral stated waiver principles to particular fact 
situations. In the course of those decisions, we at-
tempted to incorporate into the statement of the 
law of waiver those facts that led us to decide 
each of those cases as we did. Over time, we ap-
pear to have developed hopelessly inconsistent 
elaborations on the basic statement of waiver 
principles. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
% 82 Justice Zimmerman went on to note that this 
court worked its way out of this difficulty when it 
stripped the statement of the law back to its most 
basic form and told the trial courts to apply it. 
The net affect was to say that waiver is a highly 
fact-dependent question, one that we cannot 
properly review de novo in every case because 
we cannot hope to work out a coherent statement 
of the law through a course of such decisions. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
f 83 We conclude that there is much to be learned 
from our experience with the law of waiver in ap-
proaching a legal definition of privacy. The jury in-
struction concerning privacy, to which defendants 
did not object, presented the jury with a definition 
of privacy in a basic form. Hewing closely to a gen-
eral definition of privacy set out by our court of ap-
peals in Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 
944 P.2d 374, 378 (Utah Ct.App.1997), the instruc-
tion stated: 
With respect to the first element, plaintiff must 
prove an intentional and substantial intrusion 
upon his solitude or seclusion. 
There are two forms of intrusion. The first form 
is an intrusion upon a person's physical solitude 
or seclusion. The second form does not require a 
physical intrusion, but does require a prying or 
intrusion into one's private affairs, such as eaves-
dropping on private conversations, peering into 
one's home through the windows, or opening and 
reading personal mail. 
Id. 
1f 84 Defendants' failure to object to this instruction 
is reason enough to decline an extension or explora-
tion of the contours of tort privacy. We would be 
unlikely to do so anyway in light of our belief that 
the facts to which a definition of actionable privacy 
would be applied are so complex and varying that 
no rule could be articulated that would anticipate all 
of them. Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. 
f 85 Defendants have assumed a substantial risk by 
insisting that the jury verdict on the intrusion upon 
seclusion and statutory claims are subject to de 
novo review. That risk bears on yet another recur-
ring theme in this appeal-marshaling. We have de-
scribed this obligation as a defendant's burden to 
"ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and become 
a "devil's advocate." State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, f 
28, 108 P.3d 710 (citations omitted). 
*342 [16] f 86 Although we have not so expressly 
held, the rationale for the duty to marshal evidence 
has substantially less force in the context of de 
novo review. Where an appellate court is obligated 
to review the entire record anew, little is to be 
gained by requiring an appellant to play the role of 
devil's advocate and set up the opponent's case in 
its best light. Having unsuccessfully persuaded us 
to conduct a de novo review of this portion of the 
jury's adverse verdict, however, defendants are not 
excused from their obligation to marshal evidence. 
f 87 Moreover, we decline to conduct a review 
based on a traditional challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence. We do so not only because defend-
ants have failed to marshal the evidence, but be-
cause they have failed to preserve, through a chal-
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lenge to jury instructions, the legal standard against 
which the jury tested its facts. Stated simply, we 
decline to conclude that it was unreasonable for the 
jury to determine that the falsely represented pres-
ence of Ms. Sawyers in Dr. Jensen's examination 
room deprived that environment of the privacy 
status it almost certainly held if Dr. Jensen were to 
have occupied the room alone. 
f 88 We therefore affirm the jury's verdict on this 
issue. 
IV. DEFENDANTS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE ON THEIR CLAIM THAT THE 
THIRD BROADCAST WAS SUBSTANTIALLY 
TRUE 
[17] f 89 Defendants challenge the jury verdict 
awarding Dr. Jensen damages on his defamation 
and false light invasion of privacy causes of action 
on the grounds that the content of the third broad-
cast was "substantially true." That statements which 
may be infected with inaccuracy, innuendo, and 
outright falsity and still not be actionable so long as 
their "gist" or "sting" rings true is but one of count-
less ways the law defers to the commanding pres-
ence of free expression among our liberties. De-
fendants concede that certain statements made in 
the third broadcast were not "literally" true. For ex-
ample, Ms. Sawyers' use of the word "promise" to 
describe Dr. Jensen's commitment to prescribe 
Dexedrine for her was not uttered when he said, "If 
Fastin didn't work for you, I'd be willing to work 
with you, uh, maybe using Dexedrine. It's technic-
ally not legal for that reason." 
% 90 Once again, the selection of the appropriate 
standard of review is critical to the outcome of this 
issue. Citing United States Supreme Court cases as 
authority, defendants urge us to review the record 
de novo and to reach our independent judgment 
whether the content of the third broadcast was sub-
stantially true. We decline this invitation because it 
would require us to apply the wrong standard of re-
view. 
[18] f 91 Appellate review of a jury verdict or 
bench ruling in which freedom of expression is at 
issue stands as an exception to traditional protec-
tion afforded jury verdicts from appellate review. 
That a ruling is found to involve "constitutional 
facts" and merit application of a "constitutional 
rule" is an indication that much is at stake. This is 
certainly true in the case of libel. A finding that a 
libelous statement was made with actual malice suf-
ficient to permit recovery under New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281-82, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 
L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), is not reviewed with the same 
deference to the finder of that fact that would be ex-
tended to a finding of mens rea in other settings. In-
stead, where the First Amendment is implicated, the 
"actual malice" finding acquires the status of a 
"constitutional fact" requiring an appellate court to 
conduct an "independent examination of the whole 
record" to test its worthiness. Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 
499, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984); Harte-
Hanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 
U.S. 657, 685-90, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 
(1989) (extending the Bose ruling to jury trials). 
f 92 The Bose Court reasoned that the assessment 
of whether a determination that a defamatory state-
ment was animated by actual malice was one that 
intermingled fact with law-and not just any law, but 
one that implicates a "constitutional rule." 466 U.S. 
at 509, 104 S.Ct. 1949. A statement that earned the 
label of libelous thereby joined obscenity, fighting 
words, incitement to riot, *343 and child porno-
graphy as a category of unprotected speech ban-
ished from the protective embrace of the First 
Amendment. Because, however, the risk that any 
particular statement might be consigned to an un-
protected category by a judge or jury insufficiently 
attentive to the First Amendment's broad protection 
of even offensive, caustic, and inaccurate state-
ments, an appellate court is duty bound to act in its 
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role as the guardian of constitutional protections to 
undertake searching appellate review of judgments 
affecting speech. 
H 93 Justice Harlan aptly made this point when he 
noted in the context of obscenity: 
The Court seems to assume that "obscenity" is a pe-
culiar genus of "speech and press," which is as 
distinct, recognizable, and classifiable as poison 
ivy is among other plants. On this basis the con-
stitutional question before us simply becomes, as 
the Court says, whether "obscenity," as an ab-
straction, is protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and the question whether a particu-
lar book may be suppressed becomes a mere mat-
ter of classification, of "fact," to be entrusted to a 
factfinder and insulated from independent consti-
tutional judgment. But surely the problem cannot 
be solved in such a generalized fashion. Every 
communication has an individuality and "value" 
of its own. The suppression of a particular writ-
ing or other tangible form of expression is, there-
fore, an individual matter, and in the nature of 
things every such suppression raises an individu-
al constitutional problem, in which a reviewing 
court must determine for itself whether the at-
tacked expression is [suppressible] within consti-
tutional standards. Since those standards do not 
readily lend themselves to generalized defini-
tions, the constitutional problem in the last ana-
lysis becomes one of particularized judgments 
which appellate courts must make for themselves. 
I do not think that reviewing courts can escape 
this responsibility by saying that the trier of facts, 
be it a jury or a judge, has labeled the questioned 
matter as "obscene," for, if "obscenity" is to be 
suppressed, the question whether a particular 
work is of that character involves not really an is-
sue of fact but a question of constitutional judg-
ment of the most sensitive and delicate kind. 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497-98, 77 
S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (emphasis in 
original). 
f 94 In Bose, the United States Supreme Court 
reasoned that although the determination of wheth-
er a defendant acted with the malice necessary to 
sustain a libel action displayed the hallmarks of a 
finding of fact, it nevertheless required the inde-
pendent appellate review advocated by Justice Har-
lan. F N 1 ! 466 U.S. at 507 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 1949. 
FN11. Justice Stevens' majority opinion in 
Bose took care to note that the labor re-
quired to perform an independent examina-
tion of the record was less taxing than that 
required of a Court conducting de novo re-
view. 466 U.S. at 492, 104 S.Ct. 1949. The 
independent examination contemplated by 
the Bose court was limited to the portions 
of the record relevant to the issue subject 
to independent review. Such a review was, 
in the view of the Bose majority, appre-
ciably different from the review of the en-
tire judgment which is the typical scope of 
work for a reviewing court conducting de 
novo review. Id. at 514 n. 31, 104 S.Ct. 
1949. The Bose dissenters were apparently 
unimpressed with this distinction. They 
uniformly described the undertaking re-
quired by the majority as de novo review. 
Id. 
% 95 Here, we are faced with the question of wheth-
er the review of substantial truth shares sufficient 
features with the review of actual malice so that it, 
too, must be treated as a constitutional fact and giv-
en more rigorous appellate scrutiny. We conclude 
that it does not. 
[19][20] f % Unlike actual malice, obscenity, and 
other "constitutional facts," the act of assessing 
whether an allegedly defamatory statement is sub-
stantially true does not require the finder of fact to 
apply a constitutional standard to a particular set of 
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facts. *344 The task of gauging the overall 
thrust of an allegedly defamatory statement against 
the accuracy of its component parts is not one that 
demands the exercise of constitutional judgment. 
Instead, determining whether an allegedly defamat-
ory statement is substantially true calls upon finders 
of fact to engage in the work for which they are 
best suited, the discovery of truth through the ap-
plication of their judgment, life experience, and 
common sense. Therefore, we review the issue of 
whether defendants' statements were substantially 
true as a traditional question of fact. We will set 
aside the jury verdict, which was based in part on 
the finding that defendants' statements were not 
substantially true only if there exists no substantial 
FN 13 
evidence to support it. 
FN 12. This is not to say that the defense of 
substantial truth has no constitutional di-
mension. A definition of defamation that 
would expose a person to liability for any 
statement that fell short of absolute, literal 
truth would likely violate the First Amend-
ment. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 289, 84 
S.Ct. 710; Masson v. New Yorker 
Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 508-11,111 
S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991). 
FN13. Defendants also claim that we 
should evaluate the issue of substantial 
truth for correctness because they raised 
the issues in motions for summary judg-
ment and for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. Defendants have not briefed these 
novel contentions, and we decline, in the 
absence of analysis, to consider them. 
f 97 As a consequence of our holding that the de-
fense of substantial truth presents a question of fact, 
defendants assume the obligation to marshal evid-
ence. 
f 98 Defendants have failed to satisfy their duty to 
marshal. The approach taken by defendants on the 
issue of substantial truth in their reply brief high-
lights this shortcoming. The section of their brief 
addressing substantial truth is titled "Dr. Jensen has 
failed to demonstrate that the defendants' published 
statements are not substantially true." Not only 
does this statement suggest incorrectly that the bur-
den to prove this defense fell to Dr. Jensen, but it 
also conveys the erroneous notion that Dr. Jensen 
had the duty to present evidence from the record 
sufficient to carry his burden on appeal. Neither 
proposition is true. We conclude that in the absence 
of any meaningful marshaling, defendants have for-
feited a claim to our substantial evidence review of 
the defense of substantial truth. 
V. ECONOMIC DAMAGES FLOWING FROM 
THE THIRD BROADCAST 
% 99 Defendants argue that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support the jury's $1 million damages 
award to Dr. Jensen for economic losses caused by 
the third broadcast. They insist that the award was 
error because Dr. Jensen proffered no evidence that 
he suffered any economic loss that could be linked 
to the third broadcast. All evidence relating to any 
economic loss, most significantly evidence that Dr. 
Jensen was stripped of his medical privileges and 
suffered a reduction in work hours, concerned 
events that took place more than a year before the 
third broadcast. We again begin our assessment of 
this issue by setting out the standard of review and 
proof needed to sustain a jury verdict for damages. 
[21][22] t 100 We will disturb a jury verdict chal-
lenged for lack of evidence only if we conclude that 
the quantity and quality of the evidence fall short of 
"substantial." Where evidence may be susceptible 
to multiple interpretations, some tending to support 
the verdict, others pointing to an ill-advised result, 
we will indulge only those reasonable inferences fa-
vorable to the verdict. Water Energy Sys. Tech., 
Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, ffl[ 2, 15, 48 P.3d 888. 
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f 101 On this issue, defendants yet again display a 
less than zealous commitment to the duty to mar-
shal evidence. Defendants attempt to justify 
sidestepping the marshaling requirement by insist-
ing that there is no evidence on the record to mar-
shal. This tactic of marshaling avoidance is fraught 
with peril. In most instances, this ploy amounts to 
nothing more than an attempt to shift the burden of 
satisfying the sufficiency test to the appellee in a 
format that postpones any meaningful engagement 
of the sufficiency issue to the appellees' brief. This 
turns marshaling on its head. 
K 102 At the conclusion of every lawsuit that has 
survived trial and post-trial motions, the winning 
party, the trial judge, and the jury had reason to be-
lieve that there was some evidence presented to val-
idate the outcome. In bench trials, this evidence is 
reflected in the court's findings of fact. In jury tri-
als, it can be expected to be highlighted in closing 
arguments and in arguments offered *345 in oppos-
ition to directed verdicts and post-trial motions. 
Usually advocates can be counted on to put their 
best facts on display in these settings. They there-
fore offer reliable resources to parties who face a 
marshaling burden on appeal. 
f 103 Our commitment to the marshaling require-
ment is unyielding. Moreover, we disapprove of at-
tempts to evade the responsibility to marshal. These 
expressions of resolve notwithstanding, we agree 
with defendants that the record contains no discern-
ible evidence linking economic loss to the third 
broadcast. 
f 104 This is not to say that the record is devoid of 
evidence that any of the broadcasts had negative 
economic effects for Dr. Jensen. It is not. But the 
jury was asked to separately address economic loss 
traceable to the third broadcast, and it is this evid-
ence that cannot be accounted for. Indeed we are 
unable to uncover, even in the likely locations iden-
tified above, any credible assignment of economic 
loss to the third broadcast. 
% 105 In reaching this conclusion, we paid particu-
lar attention to the testimony of Dr. Jensen and Mr. 
Frank Stuart, Dr. Jensen's expert witness on eco-
nomic damages. We canvassed Dr. Jensen's re-
sponses to defendants' motions for directed verdict, 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, 
and to alter or amend the judgment. We examined 
the closing arguments of all parties. We inspected 
Dr. Jensen's exhibits graphing his income trends. 
None of these quests yielded evidence of economic 
loss tied to the third broadcast. 
% 106 We will describe our review of the record 
more fully. 
A. Plaintiffs Responses to Defendants' Motions 
[23] % 107 Dr. Jensen met defendants' motions chal-
lenging the adequacy of his economic loss evidence 
related to the third broadcast by noting that "Dr. 
Jensen testified at length regarding the patients who 
refused to see him, lost hospital privileges, and the 
cut in his hours which resulted in his need to leave 
the Art City Medical Clinic in search of work else-
where, namely nursing homes," and "[tjhese dam-
ages occurred after the November broadcast." He 
argued that as a result of the third broadcast, "now 
he works in nursing homes billing Medicare and 
Medicaid, working longer hours, and being con-
fronted with death everyday." However, the record 
does not support these assertions. Instead, the testi-
mony cited by Dr. Jensen's counsel fails to link 
these economic events to the third broadcast. 
Moreover in his response to defendants' motion for 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Dr. Jensen 
argues that "Media Defendants misstate that Dr. 
Jensen's entire damage theory was based on his re-
moval from IHC physicians' panel." Yet nowhere in 
this motion does Dr. Jensen demonstrate any tie 
between the third broadcast and economic damages. 
U 108 Dr. Jensen also contends that economic losses 
were limited to the third broadcast through the testi-
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mony of Mr. Stuart that "because Dr. Jensen was 
forced into nursing home practice, he is currently 
making less money than he would have been mak-
ing if he were still in private practice." Yet Dr. 
Jensen likened his move from private practice to 
nursing homes to his loss of IHC privileges after 
the first broadcast. It is true that Dr. Jensen left his 
position at the Art City Clinic after the third broad-
cast. However, he was not terminated from that po-
sition. Instead, when his hours were decreased at 
the clinic-possibly as a result of the third broadcast-
Dr. Jensen voluntarily left the clinic and sought 
work in the nursing home field. 
B. Plaintiff's Testimony and Exhibits 
f 109 Dr. Jensen admitted that the greatest blow to 
his income was caused by loss of IHC privileges a 
year before the third stoiy aired. On appeal, Dr. 
Jensen attempts to redirect the source of his eco-
nomic misfortune to the third broadcast. Dr. Jensen 
argues that the third broadcast made inevitable his 
termination from the Art City Clinic. Seeing his in-
voluntary separation from the clinic coming, Dr. 
Jensen resigned to take a less desirable and lower 
paying nursing home practice. 
K 110 However, the record does not support Dr. 
Jensen's perceived attempt to link his demotion to 
nursing home practice to the *346 third broadcast. 
The record shows that Dr. Jensen was told after the 
third broadcast that if another story aired he could 
be fired from the Art City Clinic. 
f i l l Tellingly, Dr. Jensen's exhibits do not reflect 
economic damage from leaving Art City and mov-
ing to nursing home work. According to his exhib-
its, Dr. Jensen made $127,606 in 1996, the year of 
the third broadcast. His income increased by sixty-
three dollars in 1997. His exhibits also graph a 
forty-thousand dollar increase in revenue between 
1996 and 1999. 
% 112 Accordingly, plaintiffs testimony and exhib-
its do not offer substantial evidence to support the 
$1 million verdict for economic loss related to the 
third broadcast. 
C. Dr. Jensen's Closing Argument 
f 113 We next turn our attention to yet another re-
source which could reasonably be counted on to 
provide clues about the evidentiary basis for Dr. 
Jensen's claim of economic loss, his closing argu-
ment to the jury. Our review of the closing argu-
ments uncovered no reference to evidence that 
might support a finding of damages for the third 
broadcast. Instead, Dr. Jensen's counsel argued that 
"as a result of the [first] newscast Dr. Jensen was 
fired from FirstMed," causing Dr. Jensen damage. 
Counsel also told the jury that as a result of the first 
broadcast Dr. Jensen no longer had IHC privileges. 
Counsel then stated that his experts demonstrated a 
"substantial drop in gross income during 1995" and 
that it takes more work to earn the same amount of 
money in nursing homes, but he articulates no link 
anywhere between the third broadcast and the dam-
age. This is because all the experts and damage fig-
ures relate to Dr. Jensen's removal from the IHC 
panel, which took place in 1995. No figures were 
tied directly to the third broadcast, which is the 
only broadcast we review. The record confirms this 
characterization of the evidence. 
D. Dr. Jensen's Argument on Appeal 
% 114 On appeal, Dr. Jensen mounts a three-
pronged attack in support of the jury's economic 
damages attributed to the third broadcast. He first 
argues that we cannot disturb the findings of the 
jury because this court must defer to a jury's find-
ings. He also insists that because the trial court 
denied motions for new trial or reduction or vaca-
tion of the award, this represents "further solidarity 
of the judgment." We disagree. As explained earli-
er, our jurisprudence gives appellate courts the right 
to vacate a jury verdict for insufficient evidence if, 
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upon review, we are unable to identify substantial 
evidence in support of the finding. As we have de-
tailed, that is the case here. 
f 115 Second, Dr. Jensen argues that defendants 
failed to marshal the evidence and merely pay "lip 
service to this obligation." As we addressed above, 
we reject this attempt to transfer the burden to de-
fendants, which cannot be met because there is, in 
fact, no discrete evidence to support an award of 
damages on the third broadcast. 
f 116 Finally, Dr. Jensen acknowledges that "in 
presenting damage calculations at trial, [his] ex-
perts did not compartmentalize the damages by 
broadcast." He argues this was not necessary be-
cause the jury heard the evidence and apportioning 
the awards by broadcast was properly left to the 
discretion of the jury. The structure of the jury ver-
dict undercuts this assertion. The jury was presen-
ted with a separate verdict form concerning eco-
nomic damages attributable to the third broadcast. 
Its award must be supported by substantial evidence 
that meets the requirements of the verdict. The re-
cord does not contain that evidence. Therefore, we 
vacate the award. 
VI. AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE RE-
CORD DOES NOT SUPPORT AN AWARD OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR ACTUAL MALICE 
IN THE THIRD BROADCAST 
% 117 The last issue defendants ask us to review is 
their contention that the jury erred in awarding Dr. 
Jensen punitive damages on the defamation and 
false light claims relating to the third broadcast. 
Defendants argue that there was not clear and con-
vincing evidence of actual malice and, therefore, 
punitive damages were improperly awarded. In 
spite of our impression that the third broadcast*347 
was likely the least defensible of the three, we con-
clude that its content does not reveal actual malice 
and therefore vacate the award of punitive dam-
ages. 
K 118 In reaching this conclusion, we conduct a 
nondeferential independent review of the record. 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 104 
S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). Although Bose 
did not concern a challenge to punitive damages, 
this distinction does not distort the suitability of its 
fit to this case. At the core of both cases is the ques-
tion of the proper standard of review to be applied 
to outcomes based on findings of actual malice con-
cerning statements that enjoyed a colorable claim to 
First Amendment protection. We therefore follow 
the prescription for independent review of the re-
cord that the content of the third broadcast was 
made by defendants with "actual malice." Id. at 
498-502, 104 S.Ct. 1949. 
[24] f 119 Statements of actual malice are those 
made "with knowledge that [they] were false or 
[made] with reckless disregard of whether [they] 
were false or not." Id. 
A. The Third Broadcast 
f 120 In the third broadcast, Ms. Sawyers targeted 
"questionable doctors" such as those who were 
"passing out drugs to addicts or worse yet, sexually 
abusing ... patients." She told viewers they could 
find out which "questionable doctors" were practi-
cing medicine in Utah by reading a Washington 
watchdog publication, "Questionable Doctors." As 
part of this report, she asked viewers, "And what 
about Dr. Michael Jensen? In July 1995 we caught 
him on camera promising me illegal drugs for 
weight loss." The report then showed Dr. Jensen 
telling Ms. Sawyers that "[i]f Fastin didn't work for 
you, I'd be willing to work with you, uh, maybe us-
ing Dexedrine. It's technically not legal for that 
reason." Ms. Sawyers then informed viewers that 
"[t]he State filed an action against Jensen last June. 
But again, the case is in the hands of lawyers and 
Dr. Jensen is still practicing." She provided a 
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"postscript" to viewers, telling them that 
[y]esterday we got word that action has now been 
taken against Dr. Michael Jensen. He's the one 
we caught on tape promising me illegal drugs. 
The state will allow Jensen to keep his license but 
hell receive a public reprimand which requires 
him to attend a workshop on proper prescribing 
and a course on medical ethics. 
B. Application of the Actual Malice Standard to the 
Third Broadcast 
[25] f 121 The centerpiece of Dr. Jensen's claim of 
actual malice is Ms. Sawyers' statement that he 
"promised" her illegal drugs. There is no doubt that 
Dr. Jensen offered to "work with her" in illegally 
prescribing Dexedrine to her, but this, as we have 
stated earlier, may not constitute a promise. De-
fendants concede the literal inaccuracy of the word 
"promise." This misstatement connotes a more un-
equivocal willingness by Dr. Jensen to flout the law 
governing prescription medicine. It does not, 
however, leave us with the clear and convincing 
impression that the accusatory distinction between 
"promise" and "work with" is sufficient to establish 
actual malice. It surely falls short of indicating per-
sonal malice rising to the level of hatred or ill-will 
on the part of defendants against Dr. Jensen. 
f 122 Our independent review of the testimony by 
Ms. Sawyers and station manager John Edwards 
persuades us that there is insufficient evidence from 
which we could conclude they did not hold an hon-
est belief that Dr. Jensen had offered or promised 
her Dexedrine, which is illegal for use in weight 
loss. The interaction between Ms. Sawyers and Dr. 
Jensen does square with the Black's Law Dictionary 
definition of promise-"The manifestation of an in-
tention to act or refrain from acting in a specified 
manner that another is justified in understanding 
that a commitment has been made...." Blacks Law 
Dictionary 1229 (7th ed.1999). It is clear that Dr. 
Jensen manifested an intent or willingness to act in 
a specific manner-to prescribe Dexedrine-although 
it was not legal for weight loss purposes. Ms. Saw-
yers testified that she believed the content of the 
third broadcast accurate or truthful because Dr. 
Jensen had twice offered her Dexedrine and she had 
confirmed with DOPL that prescribing*348 it was 
illegal. Mr. Edwards testified similarly. Thus even 
her most egregious misstatement does not rise to 
the level of actual malice. 
f 123 We do find the general tenor of the third 
broadcast troubling. By aggregating within a broad-
cast the alleged misdeeds of several physicians, the 
third broadcast had the presumably intended effect 
of shifting focus from the misconduct and disciplin-
ary fate of individual physicians to a more sensa-
tional suggestion that Utah was home to a band of 
rogue doctors imperiling the health of its citizens. 
This inference of a potentially malicious motive for 
the third broadcast enjoys, however, no greater 
claim to credibility than does Ms. Sawyers' explan-
ation that the purpose of the third broadcast was not 
to compare physicians and their offenses, but to 
educate the viewers on how to research physicians 
who might be under investigation. 
f 124 The third broadcast focused on Utah physi-
cians either in the "Questionable Doctors" book or, 
as in the case of Dr. Jensen, a physician whose con-
duct fell under the rubric of questionable. Her focus 
in the third broadcast was to "let the public know 
about how they could find out about pending ac-
tions or actions that had already been taken against 
physicians in this state." Ms. Sawyers acknow-
ledged that she did not believe that Dr. Jensen's 
conduct was as bad as the other physician she iden-
tified in the story, nor was he, at that time in 
"Questionable Doctors." She explained that her 
reason for including him in the broadcast was that 
"[Dr. Jensen] was an example of a doctor who had 
been investigated by the Division of Professional 
Licensing." Investigations by DOPL into physician 
conduct form the basis and content for editions of 
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the book "Questionable Doctors." Ms. Sawyers ad-
ded that even if she had learned of the resolution of 
the DOPL charges against Dr. Jensen, she still 
"would have said he is the one we caught on cam-
era offering me illegal drugs" because she believed 
this to be true. She also testified that the process of 
editing and preparing the third broadcast was a 
time-intensive and highly evaluative process which, 
she insists supports her position that the content of 
the broadcast and her conduct were not, nor would 
have been, made with knowledge that the broadcast 
was untruthful. 
K 125 While clearly an aberration from "fair and 
balanced" journalism, the content of the third 
broadcast leaves us unconvinced that it was the 
product of actual malice. We therefore vacate the 
award of punitive damages on the third broadcast. 
VII. DR. JENSEN'S CROSS-APPEAL 
f 126 Dr. Jensen cross-appeals on the issue of fees. 
He argues that the trial court should have awarded 
him fees because his work on the claims substan-
tially overlapped, because he did sufficiently alloc-
ate the fees between recoverable and nonrecover-
able fees, and because Ms. Sawyers did not comply 
with rule 54(d)(2). He also appeals the trial court's 
reduction of damages because the awards were 
based on duplicative claims. We affirm. 
A. Standard of Review 
[26][27][28][29] f 127 Attorney fees are awarded 
only when authorized by statute or by contract. The 
award of attorney fees is a matter of law, which we 
review for correctness. Paul DeGroot Bldg. Servs., 
L.L.C. v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, H 18, 112 P.3d 
490. However, a trial court has "broad discretion in 
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and 
we will consider that determination against an ab-
use-of-discretion standard." Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). "The stand-
ard of review on appeal of [the amount of] a trial 
court's award of attorney fees is patent error or 
clear abuse of discretion." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
B. Attorney Fees on Overlapping Claims 
[30][31] f 128 We first address whether the trial 
court erred by not awarding attorney fees on the 
overlapping claims. In general, a prevailing party 
may collect attorney fees on noncompensable 
claims only if those claims substantially overlap 
with compensable claims. *349Keith Jorgensen's, 
Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128, % 
30, 26 P.3d 872. 
% 129 The trial court properly concluded that Dr. 
Jensen was not entitled to all attorney fees because 
some of plaintiff s claims are based on the obtaining 
of information, and other claims are based on the 
broadcast of information, there is not a core of 
facts common to all claims, and the legal theories 
are unrelated. In this case, not only was some of 
the time spent on unsuccessful issues, a large por-
tion of time was spent establishing the non-
compensable claims of defamation and false 
light. 
f 130 On appeal, Dr. Jensen's counsel merely ar-
gues that "[although Dr. Jensen's claims can 
loosely be categorized as gathering of information 
claims and broadcast claims, that does not mean 
that the claims do not overlap." Not only is this ar-
gument conclusory, it fails to convince us, or 
provide us sufficient evidence, to overcome the ap-
plicable standard of review. Moreover, we agree 
with the trial court that the invasion of privacy 
claims based on newsgathering are not 
"inextricably linked" with, and require different 
proof than, the defamation and false light claims 
based on the broadcasts. We therefore defer to the 
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trial court's evaluation of the evidence and docu-
mentation submitted on the overlapping claims, and 
affirm. 
C. Attorney Fees Due to Defective Allocation Docu-
mentation 
[32] f 131 The second issue on cross-appeal-the is-
sue of attorney fees for compensable and noncom-
pensable claims-was meticulously addressed in two 
of the trial court's rulings. In July 2001, the court 
notified Dr. Jensen that his claims had failed to ad-
equately apportion between compensable (i.e., Title 
76 and common law intrusion upon seclusion 
claims), and noncompensable claims. The court in-
vited plaintiffs counsel to supplement their affi-
davits by separating out the work into three cat-
egories: (1) work that pertains specifically to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-9-401 to -406; (2) work that spe-
cifically pertains to common law intrusion upon se-
clusion; and (3) work on any other claim. With re-
gard to fees of mixed character, plaintiff was to 
break out (1) what percentage of each billing entry 
went to support common law intrusion upon seclu-
sion claims, and (2) what percentage went to sup-
port Title 76 claims. All other work was deemed to 
have been done on noncompensable claims. The 
court stated that failure to adequately separate non-
compensable and compensable claims may result in 
denial of any other fees for the commingled entry. 
[33] % 132 In the trial court's second ruling on this 
matter, it correctly explained that for it to award at-
torney fees, it must first review all the evidence and 
make specific findings of fact. Further, the party re-
questing the attorney fees must 
categorize the time and fees expended for "(1) suc-
cessful claims for which there may be an entitle-
ment to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for 
which there may be an entitlement to attorney 
fees had the claims been successful, and (3) 
claims for which there is no entitlement to attor-
ney fees." 
Foote v. Clarkf 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998) 
(quoting Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 
266, 268 (Utah 1992)). Noncompliance with these 
requirements makes it difficult, if not impossible, 
for the trial court to award the moving party fees 
because there is insufficient evidence to support the 
award. 
f 133 The trial court noted the extensive work and 
research conducted in preparation for this case. The 
court also acknowledged that the attorneys' affi-
davits did reflect the amount of work necessary to 
mount the case. The court found that Attorney 
Gardiner adequately, but not exactly, complied with 
the attorney fees documenting his time spent on 
compensable claims. However, Attorney Sine did 
not. Mr. Sine told the court it was "impossible" for 
him to separate his time and merely separated the 
time into two columns-one compensable and the 
other noncompensable. As a result, the trial court 
found it had previously warned counsel in the July 
order of the importance of adequate separation of 
the claims, yet again "Mr. Sine did not give [the 
court] sufficient evidence to determine how much 
time he spent on compensable claims and because 
the amount of *3§0 time he claimed to have spent 
on the compensable claims is unreasonable, this 
[c]ourt cannot make an appropriate evaluation." 
f 134 Mr. Sine presents one sentence for our con-
sideration of his argument on appeal. He writes: "If 
the court closely examines Attorney Sine's submis-
sions, it will see the criteria for fees was met." This 
is inadequate and does not provide sufficient legal 
reason for us to override the discretion of the trial 
court which had the ability to twice review the doc-
umentation on this issue. Affirmed. 
D. Dr. Jensen's Application for Award of All 
Claimed Costs 
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1. Ms. Sawyers complied with rule 54(d)(2) 
t 135 Dr. Jensen also argues that all of his claimed 
costs should have been awarded because Ms. Saw-
yers failed to comply with rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(d)(2) states: 
The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of the judgment serve upon 
the adverse party against whom costs are 
claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of 
his costs and necessary disbursements in the ac-
tion, and file with the court a like memorandum 
thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct, and that the dis-
bursements have been necessarily incurred in the 
action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with 
the costs claimed may, within seven days after 
service of the memorandum of costs, file a mo-
tion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after 
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the finding of fact and con-
clusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and 
filed on the date judgment is entered. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). 
[34] % 136 The sum total of Dr. Jensen's argument 
is that his timely filed motion of dissatisfaction 
with the court seeking costs in the amount of 
$122,952.66 should have been granted because Ms. 
Sawyers filed an objection, rather than a motion, 
opposing those costs. He cites no authority for sup-
port. 
f 137 Ms. Sawyers contends that the words 
"motion" and "objection" are interchangeable and 
therefore she properly complied with rule 54(d)(2). 
For support, she cites two rule 54(d)(2) cases, 
Graco Fishing & Rental Tools v. Ironwood Explor-
ation, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1988), and 
Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 847, 849 
(Utah 1978), which specifically identify the filing 
of an "objection" rather than a "motion" to convey 
the dissatisfaction with the proposed distribution of 
cost awards. 
f 138 We agree with Ms. Sawyers that motion and 
objection are interchangeable in this case. Black's 
Law Dictionary defines a motion as a "written or 
oral application requesting a court to make a spe-
cified ruling or order." 1031 (7th ed.1999). An ob-
jection is defined as a "formal statement opposing 
something that has occurred, or is about to occur, in 
court." Id. at 1101. In this case, having reviewed 
Ms. Sawyers' objection to the memorandum of veri-
fied costs which follows the same framework as a 
motion, we conclude that the distinction Dr. Jensen 
asks us to make is too narrow and violates the in-
tent and spirit of rule 54(d)(2). We affirm the trial 
court's finding that Ms. Sawyers complied suffi-
ciently with rule 54(d)(2). 
2. Dr. Jensen's claimed costs were not "Necessary 
Disbursements" 
[35] f 139 Dr. Jensen appeals the trial court's denial 
of his application for costs for "necessary disburse-
ments" authorized under rule 54(d)(2) and associ-
ated with his claim for transcript costs, expert wit-
ness fees, court equipment expenses, and other out-
of-pocket costs. Dr. Jensen claims that the trial 
court erred by too strictly applying the rule we set 
out in Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 
1980). The trial court supported its position by 
writing that "the Utah Supreme Court has stated 
that 'there is a distinction to be understood' 
between legitimate and taxable costs and other ex-
penses of litigation which may ever be so neces-
sary, but are not taxable as costs" (citing Frampton, 
605 P.2d at 774). Dr. Jensen argues that we should 
reverse or modify the Frampton rule because*351 
rule 54(d)(2) does not distinguish between taxable 
costs and litigation expenses and because the 
Frampton rule omits the "necessary disbursements" 
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language in rule 54(d)(2). We disagree. 
[36] U 140 We again reference the appropriate 
standard of review for costs under rule 54(d)(2). "A 
trial court's decision to award the prevailing party 
its costs will be reviewed under an abuse of discre-
tion standard." Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, f 4, 16 
P.3d 549. Moreover, in Frampton we instructed that 
the trial court has a "duty to guard against excesses 
or abuses" in awarding costs. 605 P.2d at 773. 
f 141 The trial court's order on this issue carefully 
reviewed this court's body of law on necessary dis-
bursements and costs. The court makes clear that 
many of Dr. Jensen's proposed costs violate the 
Frampton rule against unnecessary costs. Specific-
ally, the court found that some of the deposition 
costs were not essential or Dr. Jensen could not 
demonstrate that a less expensive means of obtain-
ing the transcripts would not have been practical. 
The court reminded the parties that "[c]osts 
were not recoverable at common law; and are there-
fore generally allowable only in the amounts and in 
the manner provided by statute." Frampton, 605 
P.2d at 773. As a result, a number of items were 
held unrecoverable by statute-those included a 
video consultant and court equipment expenses. 
FN 14. In Young, we determined that a suc-
cessful plaintiff seeking costs must show 
"the deposition was so essential to the case 
... that the information provided by the de-
position could not have been obtained 
through less expensive means of discov-
ery." 2000 UT 91, f 11, 16 P.3d 549. 
f 142 Dr. Jensen tries to make a case for rejecting 
Frampton, arguing that the question of necessary 
costs should not be left entirely to the discretion of 
the legislature and because it may violate the open 
courts clause in the Utah Constitution by limiting 
"recoverable costs to those conservatively specified 
by the legislature." We disagree. For twenty-five 
years, Frampton has remained our guiding principle 
for allocation of recoverable costs. The trial court 
properly applied Frampton to the issue of recover-
able costs. Dr. Jensen has failed to persuade us with 
sufficient authority or evidence that we should 
overrule Frampton and reject the guidelines estab-
lished by the legislature for appropriate recoverable 
costs. We therefore affirm. 
CONCLUSION 
f 143 Having held that Dr. Jensen's false light inva-
sion of privacy claims arising from the first and 
second broadcasts are subject to the statute of limit-
ations governing defamation and therefore time-
barred, we vacate the verdict and damages awards 
based on that claim. Our holding that the jury im-
properly awarded economic loss and punitive dam-
ages to Dr. Jensen on his claims relating to the third 
broadcast results in the modification of the damages 
award to $500,000 subject to apportionment based 
on the jury's allocation of fault. 
% 144 Having affirmed the trial court on all other is-
sues raised on appeal, the remaining elements of the 
judgment are undisturbed. 
f 145 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief 
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice 
PARRISH concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion. 
Utah,2005. 
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